CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY
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When a philosopher has once laid hold of a favorite principle, which perhaps accounts for many natural effects, he extends the same principle over the whole creation, and reduces to it every phenomenon, though by the most violent and absurd reasoning. - HUME, “The Sceptic,” Works, Vol. III (1826), p. 180.

To give anything approaching an adequate account of contemporary sociology would be a difficult task. Just at present we are in that initial stage of the science in which a great army of really honest and earnest workers is wholly without organization - an army, it might be called, all the members of which are officers having the same rank, and none subject to the orders of any other. Each one is pursuing the one particular line that he has chosen. Nearly everyone has some one single thought, which he believes to embrace, when seen as he sees it, the whole field of sociology, and he is elaborating that idea to the utmost. Now, it is clear that he will make much more of that idea than anyone else could make. He will get all the truth out of it that it contains. It is true that he will carry it too far and weight it down with implications that it will not bear, but these are, like the errors of all scientific investigators, subject to universal criticism and ultimate rejection by putting the real truth in their place.

The notion has always been prevalent that men of one idea are useless, or worse than useless. The fact is that they are the most useful of all men. I do not refer to such as are afflicted with the pathologic idée fixe, but to those who are, as it were, possessed and consumed by some single thought, some favorite hypothesis, some heuristic conception, which grows larger and more all-comprehensive, until it impels them to pursue it untiringly to its last logical conclusion and to work into it great fields of truth that no name that can be given it would even suggest to anyone else. Work done under such an inspiration is thoroughly done. The analysis is exhaustive, and it never fails, notwithstanding the necessary error and exaggeration, to
constitute a substantial contribution to the general stock of human knowledge and to the true progress of science.

All sciences pass through a long analytic period before reaching the synthetic stage. Sociology is still in its analytic period. There is even a disposition to condemn all attempts at synthesis. No one will recognize anything done by others. There is a spirit of intense individualism. There is no disposition to appropriate the truth that is being produced. The ideas that are put forth seem to have no affinity for one another. On the contrary, they are mutually repellant. There is little real controversy, because everyone regards all other ideas as quite unworthy of attention. There is, therefore, no discussion, and the necessary prelude to co-ordination is discussion. When different writers shall begin to discuss one another's ideas, there will be some hope of an ultimate basis being found for agreement, however narrow that basis may be.

In this perfectly independent way a large number of what may be called systems of sociology are being built up, most of which are regarded by their authors as complete and as superseding all other systems. Any attempt to present all these systems to the reader would require a volume. This has, however, already been done in great part, and ably, by Professor Paul Barth(1*) in the introduction to a work whose title indicates that he has himself a system, but who differs from most of his contemporaries in not only respecting, but in understanding, other systems. The most that I can do here is rapidly to enumerate the principal systems or general conceptions of sociology.

Properly I should confine the enumeration to scientific conceptions, but some of the most widespread and popular of these conceptions lie outside the pale of science. They belong to the pre-scientific period. They are to sociology what astrology is to astronomy, alchemy to chemistry, and horuspicy to physiology. Such is the greater part, for example, of the so-called Christian sociology, and with this is to be classed all that well-meant treatment of social problems which looks only to

immediate reform of social evils, and which is characterized by warmth of sentiment, usually accompanied by personal vituperation.

A distinction is also to be made between an -ism and an -ology. I do not, for example, question the legitimacy of socialism as a subject for study and a field of labor, but it relates to action and implies a purpose, which excludes it at least from any pure science. Its relations to applied sociology need not be discussed here.

In the following enumeration of the principal systems of sociology I shall endeavor to find some single word or expression for each of the leading ideas, conceptions, doctrines, subjects, or groups of social facts characterizing them, which must sometimes be taken in a somewhat broader sense than the one that is current for the term, but with such explanations as I shall make I do not think that any confusion or misunderstanding is likely to arise.

I. SOCIOLOGY AS PHILANTHROPY.

It is probably safe to say that this conception of sociology is the prevailing one with the public today. The word now frequently occurs in the newspapers, but always in this sense. More than nine-tenths of the papers that are read before the American Social Science Association proceed from that idea of social science. It is the housing of the poor, charity work generally, slumming, reform work in the neglected quarters of cities, settlement work, etc. Sometimes it gets beyond the tenement house and sweating system and deals with consumers' leagues and co-operative stores. It includes such municipal reforms as public baths and lavatories, and the placing of public parks, gardens, and art galleries within the reach of the less well-to-do classes. This cannot be called a system of sociology, and it has no one leading advocate or exponent, but it is the common notion of what sociology or social science is, and is all the idea that the general public, the newspaper reporter or editor, or the average member of Parliament or of Congress has of it. Of course, it is not science at all, and therefore it cannot be
sociology at all. No one will, however, be so illogical as to construe this into condemning it. It is social work, often of a high order, and for the most part very useful, but it is not sociology. Nor need it be denied that there are aspects of philanthropy that may and should be made scientific. Such are all attempts to grasp those principles of human nature which lead to methods of dealing with the poor and the unfortunate that will permanently elevate them and not make parasitic degenerates of them nor bring about the survival of the unfit. Such was most of the work of Professor Amos G. Warner. We may therefore heartily indorse the words of another professional philanthropist when he says:

I plead, therefore, here as everywhere wherever chance gives me opportunity, for a more intimate association and fellowship between professional sociologists and professional philanthropists. I deplore the sociological teaching which is fragmentary, disjointed, a mere mosaic of quotations from the reports of actual observers of human life in its various aspects, arranged without regard to proportion or perspective, and which produces the effect upon the mind of a Chinese painting resembling nothing in heaven or earth.(1*)

II. SOCIOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY.

Among scientific men by far the most common conception of sociology is one that is essentially anthropological. The moment the subject of human society is presented, it brings up the wider conception of man as the being whose association constitutes it, and with the natural scientific habit of looking for the origin and development of things, attention is at once turned to primitive, uncivilized, barbaric, and savage man, and this field proves so large and so attractive that it holds the attention. It cannot be denied that anthropology, as the science of man, has as one of its departments the laws and forms of human association, and from this point of view sociology is a branch of anthropology. But there is another point of view which treats sociology as an abstract science and not as a branch of zoölogy, and thus viewed it stands as one of the great co-ordinate independent sciences alongside of biology, chemistry, and physics. Most

sociologists look at it from this point of view; but even then many consider it necessary to dwell
mainly on the forms of association of primitive peoples. This has the advantage of making it certain
that the foundations of sociology will be laid broad and deep.

There is one special school that call their science anthroposociology, which seeks primarily a
classification of the western European races based on physical and mental characteristics. The
facts collected by this school are highly interesting and important, but they draw from them a train of
conclusions which are one-sided and largely false. So far as the application of the facts is
concerned, it is characterized by what may be called teutonolatry, which is the more remarkable as
the school is headed by a Frenchman. The point of view is very narrow, scarcely going beyond what
the present state of things seems to teach, and quite ignoring even early human history. It would be
unfortunate for them if it should ever be shown that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were dark-haired
and dark-eyed brachy-brunes, as seems very probable. Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar may
not have been blond beasts at all, although they were the kind of beasts that are worshiped by
Ammon and Nietzsche. And has it ever been proved that Napoleon Bonaparte, the Corsican, was
not of the species *Homo mediterraneus* rather than *H. europæus*? Certain it is that the theory
formulated from the facts of anthroposociology utterly fails to account for all the early civilizations
that was around the Mediterranean and in the valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates.

**III. SOCIOLOGY AS BIOLOGY.**

If, among scientific sociologists, the anthropological school is the most widespread, the biological
school is certainly just now the most earnest, vigorous, and aggressive. It takes the definite form of
looking upon human society as an organism in strict analogy with an animal or vegetable organism.
We are nowhere told to which of the three great "kingdoms of nature," mineral, vegetable, animal,
this organism belongs. It can scarcely be mineral or vegetable, but is it animal? Or does it
form a kingdom apart, not yet recognized by the books? Another question that troubles the specialists in biology is whether this organism is to be regarded as a species, a genus, a family, or some higher classificatory group. If a species, to what genus does it belong? If a genus, to what family, etc.? There are as many questions of this kind as there are classificatory groups, until we reach the primary subdivision of nature into kingdoms, and we have seen that even here the same question still confronts us, and, so far as I am aware, no one has attempted to answer any of these questions.

Notwithstanding these difficulties that confront the biological specialist (and I know of no "organicist" who is such), the analogy possesses such a charm that it fascinates a large number of able and vigorous investigators, and they have pursued it, one would suppose, to its utmost limits. The passion for analogies has been at once one of the most powerful stimuli to research and one of the greatest sources of error in the history of science. It arises from the great strength which the faculty of causality acquired in the human mind at a very early period in its development. This faculty is the basis of all the early world-views of the race, and underlies all anthropomorphic conceptions. It is its action that is referred to when we hear it said that religion and science start from the same point and have essentially the same object, viz., to explain the universe. But we most carefully distinguish between causality and ability to perceive causal connections. The idea of natural causation and the faculty by which it is cognized us of comparatively recent date and are developed only in relatively few minds. The old philosophers called this faculty the ratio sufficiens, and the German metaphysicians translate this into their Satz vom zureichenden Grunde, or simply Satz vom Grunde. Causality is rather the sense of a need for some explanation in terms of a cause, and the question of its sufficiency or adequacy is usually left quite out of view. Everything combines to show that the world has always been just as well satisfied with an inadequate as with an adequate explanation. If it only gives some explanation, the mind is at rest. The wildest magic completely satisfied, not only the Orient, but
the unscientific part of the Occident, and, as a matter of fact, the great majority of those who inhabit
the most enlightened countries have a very imperfect idea of the relations between causes and
effects. The serious alarm of the Pai-Ute Indians in 1875, at my suggestion to throw a cap-box full
of ground cedar berries into Fish Lake, in Utah, lest it might poison the whole lake and kill them all,
is closely paralleled by the fright that seizes the average civilized woman at the sight of the outside
of a bottle marked *Poison!* over the cross bones.
Now, the love of analogy is based on the innate craving for an explanation of phenomena,
unaccompanied for the most part, as in the case of magic and anthropomorphic ideas, by any
strong demand that the explanation be adequate and the cause a sufficient one. This it is which
vitiates so much of the reasoning of ethnographers relative to similar conditions found in widely
separated regions, as in the Old and New Worlds, and leads to false theories of derivation of
customs by one people from another. The Pythagoreans, who studied musical tones in stringed and
wind instruments, and who also studied the heavenly bodies, saw an analogy between them, and
taught the "music of the spheres." This music, they said, would be perceptible to the human ear if it
were not perpetual and constantly heard from infancy through life, while we can be conscious only
of sounds in which there is an interchange between sound and silence.(1*)
Not to be confounded with this, but equally mythical and mystical, is Schopenhauer's fanciful
analogy between musical tones and the various "objectivations of the will," according to which the
bass notes represent the earth and planets and inorganic matter generally, while the higher
ascending tones typify the dawn and progress of life, feeling, and thought.(2*) Sacred numbers are
familiar to all, being found connected with nearly all great religious and philosophic systems. The
number seven is by far the most common, and many attempts to explain it have been made. The
last, and perhaps the best, derives it from the

1) ARISTOTLE, *De Coelo*, II, 9, 4.
widespread heptalogy of savages relating to direction and position, viz., the north, the south, the
east, the west, the zenith, the nadir, and the here. There are always "seven wonders of the world,"
and even Du Bois-Raymond was so far influenced by the myth that he wrote of the "Seven World-
Riddles," when he might have made them either more or less. The number five, so universal in all
systems of counting and calculation, due, of course, to the number of digits in men, has entered
less into philosophy, but the "pentalogies" of Major Powell(1*) constitute an interesting psychologic
study from our present point of view, all the more on account of his specific claim (p. 112) that all of
his pentalogic properties are correlated with due decimal system and the number of digits (2*)
The general idea of a social organism is very old. Aristotle expressed it quite clearly, not only in his
much-quoted ζωον πολιτικόν, but in passages in which he declares that society is a giant having
hands, feet, sense, and intelligence. St. Paul is supposed to have virtually embodied it in Romans,
chap. 12, and 1 Corinthians, chap. 12. Marcos Aurelius said something very similar, and other
cases might be cited earlier than Hobbes, who made the state an artificial man of vast power, and
emphasized the organic conception in the name Leviathan of his principal work. But no scientific or
properly biologic treatment of the subject was made prior to the nineteenth century. Comte in 1838
seems to be the first to mention a social organism. He said:

One may form a philosophic idea, just in all respects and of true essential nature of these real variations by
comparing them especially with analogous variations in the animal organism, which are exactly like them, as
subject to similar conditions, whether static or dynamic, with this sole rational difference that social
modifications may become more extensive and varied than simple biologic modifications. …. The essential
principle, established especially by the labors of the illustrious Broussais, destined henceforth to characterize
the philosophic spirit of positive pathology, is, by its nature, as applicable to the social organism as to the
individual organism. (3)

1) Truth and Error; or, The Science of Intellection (Chicago, 1898), passim.
Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his *Social Statics*, published in 1850, says:

We commonly enough compare a nation to a living organism. We speak of “the body politic,” of the functions of its parts, of its growth, and of its diseases, as though it were a creature. But we usually employ these expressions as metaphors, little suspecting how close is the analogy, and how far it will bear carrying out. So completely, however, is a society organized on the same system as an individual being, that we may perceive something more than analogy between them.

He then proceeds to give certain examples, and adds:

Hence we are warranted in considering the body as a commonwealth of monads, each of which has independent powers of life, growth, and reproduction; each of which unites with a number of others to perform some function needful for supporting itself and all the rest; and each of which absorbs its share of nutriment from the blood. And when thus regarded, the analogy between an individual being and a human society, in which each man, while helping to subserve some public want, absorbs a portion of the circulating stock of commodities brought to his door, is palpable enough.(1*)

The exhaustive treatment which Mr. Spencer subsequently gave the subject is well known,(2*) yet, after Professor Huxley had so clearly shown in his “Administrative Nihilism”(3*) that the doctrine necessarily leads to the most extreme form of socialism, he qualified it to such an extent that he is scarcely claimed by the organicists as a member of that school.

Bluntschli(4*) is usually cited as one of the pioneers, though it is mainly the state with which he is dealing; but the works of Lilienfeld(5*) and Schaeffle(6*) are the fundamental contributions upon which the doctrine rests. Its two other principal contemporary defenders and M. Jacques Novicow and M. René Worms. It is to be classed along with the idea that has often been put

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1) These passages occur on pp. 451-3 of the original edition of 1850, and on pp. 267, 268 of the abridged and revised edition published in 1892 in a volume which also contains his essays entitled “The Man versus the State.”
4) *Allgemeines Staatsrecht*, 1852.
forth that the earth is an organism or great animal, (1*) the notion of Wilhelm Humboldt that
language is an organism, (2*) and the fancies of Fourier, who saw living beings in the stars and
planets, and even in the constellations.

It is remarkable how far it is possible to carry such a theory when a large number of acute minds are
fixed upon it for a considerable time. In the following enumeration of some of the leading specific
analogies that have been pointed out I make no apology for their lack of harmony, but simply give
them as I find them. I omit the fanciful analogies of Hobbes and other early writers, and limit the
enumeration to such as have been more or less seriously proposed by modern sociologists.

The social unit or cell is the individual. (Spencer, Lilienfeld, etc.)
The social unit is the family. (Comte, Schaefle.)
The social unit is the clan.
The family is a social molecule.
Individuals are social atoms. (Ludwig Stein, Ratzenhofer.)
[The last two analogies go back to physics. It is somewhat surprising that no one seems to have thought of
comparing men to sperm cells and women to germ cells. The married or propagating couple would then
correspond to the fertilized ovum or blastosphere.]
The gens represents a segment of segmented animals (Annelidæ). (Durkheim.)
The lower (mechanical) societies represent the segmented type of animals; higher types take on the structure
of the arthropods. (Durkheim.)
Social tissues are settlements, roads, buildings, etc. (locative); facilities of exchange, commerce, trade,
production (commercial); civil and military appliances and technique (administrative). (De Groot.)
Social tissues consist of the simpler voluntary organizations of society. (Lilienfeld.)

1) AUGUSTE COMTE, Politique positive, Vol. I, p. 441. (Comte does not defend the doctrine, he only
characterizes it.)
2) Now Wilhelm von Humboldt's view that language is an "organism" has been considered a great step in
philological speculation; and so far as it has led students to turn their minds to the search after general laws,
no doubt it has been so. But it has also caused an increase of vague thinking and talking, and thereby no small
The social ectoderm or mucous layer is the governing class; the social endoderm or serous layer ist the governed mass (proletariat); the social mesoderm or vascular layer ist the bourgeoisie. (Spencer.)
The relations of contract constitute the tissues and structures of society. (De Greef.)
Contract is equivalent to the distribution of the nutritive matter in the body, which is a kind of physiological contract. (Durkheim.)
The aristocracy and the clergy constitute the social adipose! (Giard.)
The more complex social organizations are organs of society, e.g., an academy of arts is an organ that may be likened to an eye. (Lilienfeld.)
The economic operations of society (production, distribution, exchange, consumption) constitute its nutritive processes (mastication, deglutition, digestion, assimilation). (Worms.)
The circulating mass of commodities in society constitutes its blood. (Spencer.)
Merchandise in transit is unassimilated nutriment (chyme, chyle?). (Lilienfeld.)
Money is the homologue of the blood corpuscles. (Spencer, Comparison also made by Liebig.)
Roads, railroads, water ways, etc., constitute the blood-vessels of society. (Spencer.)
The telegraph, the postal system, roads, railroads, water ways, banks, money, etc., constitute together the circulatory system of society. (De Greef.)
The bourse is the social heart. (Worms.)
The substance or matter of society consists of territory and population, of which the first is its bony framework and the second ist muscular and fleshy portion. (De Greef.)
The whole material environment of man constitutes "intercellular substance." (Lilienfeld.)
Profit is the excess of nutrition over waste in the animal body. (Spencer.)
Corporations are social glands. (Spencer.)
Colonization is social reproduction. (Worms.)
Population is the male part and the material environment the female part of the social superorganism. (De Greef.) [Putting this with the analogy given above by the same author for these same elements, it follows that flesh is male and bone is female!]
Conquering races are male, conquered races female; the struggle of races corresponds to the struggle of the spermatozoa around the ovum. The latter is passive, submits, and fertilization (the so-called cross-fertilization of cultures) take place. (Lilienfeld.)
Celibates are the polar bodies rejected in the process of karyokinesis. (Dissard.)
Persons who go from society to another are analogous to leucocytes and spermatozoa. (Lilienfeld.)
The state is the central organ (brain?) of society. (Lilienfeld.)
Government is the homologue of the brain. (This view is held with qualifications by the majority of organicists.)
The nervous system corresponds to the political power variously expressed. This qualification of the last-mentioned analogy admits the comparison of all grades of societies with all stages of animal development. Fully worked out by Spencer.
Subordinate governments, as of provinces, departments (in France), states (of the United States), countries, municipalities, etc., represent the hierarchy of ganglia of the developed nervous system. (Spencer, who calls special attention to the representative character of both.)
Society itself represents a brain (organ) rather than an organism, and the individual brains of men constitute its cells. (Tarde, Logique sociale, p. 127.)
The brain of the social organism consists of the élite of mankind. (Novicow, who totally rejects the doctrine that government is the homologue of the brain.)
The sympathetic nervous system of society is that which controls the material and physical phenomena (production, consumption, reproduction), while the cerebro-spinal system regulates the more spiritual phenomena, such as beliefs, customs, arts, etc. (De Greef.)
Voluntary contract represents the sympathetic system, while the state corresponds to the cerebro-spinal system of society. (Durkheim.)
Trades unions and guilds are the ganglia of the sympathetic nervous system of society. (Durkheim.)
Telegraph wires correspond the nerve fibers. (Spencer.) [Lilienfeld denies that organicists have defended this analogy, and in his system they belong to the intercellular substance, but a passage on p. 102 of his Pathologie sociale has been construed to harmonize with the Spencerian doctrine.]
Government is the homologue of the soul or consciousness, the formal unity or ego. (Bernès.)
Government represents the conscious will. (Spencer, Tarde.)
History is social memory. (Garofalo.)
Military societies represent the Carnivora or predatory animals generally; industrial societies represent the Ungulata and other herbivorous and frugivorous animals. (Fouillée.)

It is, of course, obvious to anyone who has followed the literature of this subject that the above list by no means exhausts the stock of specific analogies that have been pointed out between society and an organism. It may be regarded as embracing a few samples that are fairly representative of the whole.
The term *analogy* is constantly used for these parallels, but no one, not even Spencer, has pretended that it is taken in the biological sense. Analogous organs in biology are those that perform a like *function*, but are constructed on an entirely different plan. For example, the eyes of mollusks and of vertebrates, though serving for the same purpose, are altogether different structures; the wings of insects, of bats, and of birds, all enable their possessors to fly, but all three are distinct organs anatomically; the proboscis of a hawk-moth greatly resembles the long beak of some humming birds, and both are used to penetrate tubular flowers, but, of course, they have no structural resemblance; the horseshoe crab chews with its legs, and the various sexual calls of insects (crickets, cicadas, grasshoppers, etc.), corresponding in purpose to the notes of birds, are made by various parts of the body, but not in the mouth or throat; the termites or white ants (Neuroptera) have neutral workers like true ants (Hymenoptera), but they are not functionless females, and seem to have been produced by like social necessities. The structures and functions of society that are compared with those of organisms stand in no such relation as this. There is no principle or plan of construction which admits of comparison. The functions performed or purpose subserved is somewhat similar, and this is all that can be said. It only proves that in all departments of nature there is a cosmic law that works similar results.

Still less do these "analogies" possess the character of biological *homologies*. These are cases in which the same structure produces a different organ, the reverse of analogies. For example, the fin rays of fishes are the same structures as the fingers and toes of men, and the digits generally of the higher vertebrates, and the latter are the homologues of the former. But not only is there a transition form among living and fossil animals, viz., the Dipneustra, in which the number of digits is much greater than in the Amphibians, where it became fixed at five, but there is a corresponding embryonic stage in the ontogeny of all the higher vertebrates, including man, at which the phylogenetic record of a many-toed ancestry is preserved. The
process of reduction of digits was resumed with the Ungulata, becoming two in cloven-footed animals (cattle, sheep, hogs, etc.), and finally only one in the Solidungula (Equidæ), or horse family, the toeless feet of which are still the homologues of fins. This entire series of transitions has now been thoroughly worked out in the paleontological history of this group, from the five-toed Eohippus of the Eocene to the true horses of the existing fauna. Again, all the appendages of the skin of animals, for whatever purpose used, are homologous, as scales of fishes, plates and scutes of reptiles, feathers of birds, hair of mammals, and even the teeth. Transitions are seen in the hair of the cassowary and the quills of the porcupine.

The social "analogies" are nothing of this sort, and the biological specialist, however clearly he may perceive the parallelism, is wholly at a loss to classify them according to any known biological system. Lilienfeld insists that they are "real" analogies, by which he seems to mean that they are the identically same structures, organs, and functions that occur in living organisms. There is no scientific basis for even discussing such a proposition.

A favorite escape from some of these difficulties is to call society a "superorganism," and Tarde, one of the severest critics of the organic theory, proposes the form "supra-organism" as more clearly expressing the distinction, a view, that Novicow is disposed to accept. Lilienfeld declares that the social organism is the highest and furthest developed of all existing organisms;(1*) Fouillée calls it an organism of ideas; and Paulhan and Giddings see in it an organism or association of minds; all of which only shows in how many ways the subject may be viewed.

It is obvious to many that the only "analogies" that approach the biological sense of the term, or have such a significance as to promise any useful results, are those that relate to the organs of control and interadjustment of parts, the "internuncial system," the co-ordinating and subordinating apparatus. This, of course, corresponds to the organs of consciousness in the animal organism, in short to the brain and

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1) Gedanken, etc., Vol. I, p. 51
nervous system. In other words, the chief and only useful analogies are not properly biological, but psychological. This is because the same psychic qualities that belong to the animal organism are at work in society through the co-operation of its organic units, the minds of men. But although the mind of man is more highly organized than that of lower animals, so that individual men move on a higher psychic plane than individual animals, still the spontaneous activities generated in human society by the interaction of the psychic units in the resultant so-called social consciousness do not, as a matter of act, produce a co-ordinating system of a high order, nothing approaching the perfect adjustment and subordination of the parts to the whole that we see in any of the developed animal organisms. To find any kind of parallel we are obliged to go down among the lowest organic forms, to the state known as the cormus. Here we find every degree of co-ordination, from the simple colony held together by invisible lines along which the internuncial currents are vaguely propagated, to mere chains of cells with something corresponding to nerves connecting them, and thence on to the earliest segmented organisms. No one can have failed to notice that it is chiefly with such primitive creatures that Mr. Spencer makes his comparisons. He was so much impressed with this necessity that he was finally forced by his critics to say in a footnote that his comparisons were general, and that “if any specific comparison were made, which it cannot rationally be, it would be to some much lower vertebrate form than the human.”(1*)

It is a matter of common observation that the deliberations of public bodies of men are not marked by the degree of good sense and judgment that characterizes the best minds that compose them. Indeed, they all below the average intelligence of the members, and probably below that of the least intelligent individuals in such bodies. Spencer remarks that “not only is the corporate conscience lower than the average individual conscience, but the corporate intelligence too.”(2*) Gabelli has reduced this to the formula that “the faculties of men working

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2) Study of Sociology, p. 289.
together obliterate each other and are not added together."(1*) Novicow admits that human societies should not be compared with animals as highly differentiated as the higher vertebrates, but with representatives of the Tunicata (barnacles), for example. This, of course, rather supports than opposes his favorite theory that the élite constitute the social consciousness, but that theory has the fatal objection that it leaves society without any central organ of control at all, for whatever may be the moral influence of the élite, it possesses no authority, and purposely keeps aloof from all interference with social events. It is wholly unorganized, and really exerts less power in society than is exercised by unorganized crowds and mobs. These latter, as everybody knows, display the minimum intelligence, and represent the non-rational, animal state, where feeling reigns supreme. We must therefore fall back upon the prevalent view that government or the state is the homologue of the brain and ganglionic hierarchy in the developed animal, and here, it must be confessed, there is a general parallel and quite an array of special parallels. The difficulty with it is that, as already remarked, and as has been perceived by a score of writers, neither the degree of differentiation nor of integration is equal to that of any such animals. We may perhaps be thankful that it is not, for anything approaching it would realize the wildest socialistic dreams. Dr. Pioger, who is not at all frightened at this prospect, says:

It is not because societies do not constitute living organisms that they resemble those exoduses so little, but because at present they are only in a lower stage of their development, and because, if we wished to compare them at all to living organisms, we should do so, not with the higher animals, but with the lower organisms called polyzoans, in which physiological individualization is still imperfect.(2*)

Huxley's celebrated remark on this point in his address before the Midland Institute on October 9, 1871, and published in the

1) "Le forze degli nomini uniti si eldono e non si sommano" (ARISTIDE GABELLI, L'Istruzione in Italia (Bologna, 1891), Part I, p. 257.
2) DR. JULIEN PIOGER, La vie sociale, la morale et le progrès (Paris, 1894).
Fortnightly Review for November 1, 1871, under the title "Administrative Nihilism," (1*) is too familiar to need quoting here, but this and other criticisms led Mr. Spencer to append to p. 613 of the first edition of Vol. I of his Principles of Sociology the following footnote:

This emphatic repudiation of the belief that there is any special analogy between the social organism and the human organism I have a motive for making. A rude outline of the general conception elaborated in the preceding eleven chapters was published by me in the Westminster Review for January, 1860. In it I expressly rejected the conception of Plato and Hobbes, that there is a likeness between social organization and the organization of a man’s body; saying that “there is no warrant whatever for assuming this.” Nevertheless, criticisms upon the article ascribed to me the idea which I had thus distinctly condemned.

Whatever may have been Mr. Spencer’s motives, it is at least apparent to others that the doctrine, even as set forth by himself in the Westminster Review, is inconsistent with his general hostility to government and the enlargement of state functions.

We will next glance, still more briefly, at the other side of the subject, and consider a few of the objections that have been raised to the organic theory of society, and especially endeavor to enumerate the principal respects in which society has been shown to differ from an organism. Merely mentioning the three principal distinctions pointed out by Spencer from the first - viz.: that societies are (1) discrete instead of concrete, (2) asymmetrical instead of symmetrical, and (3) sensitive in all their units, but insensible in their ensemble, in all of which cases the reverse is true of living organisms - we may enumerate, as among the structures, organs, and functions of society which have no proper counterparts in any organic being: language, religion, contract, symbolism, migration, and exportation; and as among those belonging to living organisms which have no proper counterparts in society: birth, death, reproduction. Tine analogies that have been pointed out in all these cases are admittedly weak and unsatisfactory. The following points that

have been made against the organic theory may also be regarded as well taken:

1. Societies become more and more settled as they develop, which is the reverse of the process in biology. For example, nomads represent the free swimming state of the lower animals, and the settled societies represent the fixed state, as of polyps, sponges, etc.

2. The higher a society, the less it feels the loss of any organ, the reverse being the case among living organisms.

3. There is nothing in human society to correspond to the great sympathetic plexuses, which have with much truth been called the physical basis of man's moral nature.

4. As regards the élite as the social sensorium, it is well known that intelligence tends to divide men, just as interest (feeling) unites them. The élite is therefore a centrifugal force in society, working for disintegration.

All these points - and many more might be adduced - are quite independent of the general biological and classificatory considerations urged at the beginning of this section.

About all that is left of the doctrine of the social organism is that society, like an animal or a plant, but also like language, law, the state, art, and science, is something organized - an organization. Organization is a universal or cosmical process, and in its fundamental aspects is very uniform.

Society differs fundamentally from an organism in not being a concrete object at all. We cannot properly say that it consists of men and women, nor of their material environment, nor of both these together. Man is a species or a genus, according to the scope given to these terms, but society is neither of these, nor any other classific group. It comes nearer to the conception of a herd or flock, of which the individual members are imperfectly held together by a certain psychic force. It is, however, much more like a corporation, voluntary organization, church, or other association of men.

In fact, association is its essence, and sociology is the science of human association. But association is an act, and an association is a product of the act of associating. It is a relation among individuals. Now, a relation is not a
concrete object. It is an abstract conception. Nothing but the individual is concrete. A species is not a material thing. A genus is only a mental conception. The social-organism theory is a sort of modern revival of the old scholastic realism. The truth is that society is a relation, but when we examine all forms of truth we shall find that most of it is of this class, and also that relations are the most important of all things.

IV. SOCIOLOGY AS POLITICAL ECONOMY

So large a part of social phenomena relates to material things that many economists decline to recognize sociology as a science distinct from economics. Of this class we need not speak. There is, however, another class of economists who clearly see that economics are commonly taught fails to include large fields of phenomena that are of the highest importance, especially phenomena relating to population in a broader sense than that usually given to the science of demography. These economists would enlarge the scope of economics to embrace these fields. This department they often designate as social economics or social economy. This latter expression was used by John Stuart Mill when he was trying to find a name for a great science which he clearly saw to exist, distinct from political economy.\(^1\) He then said: "This science stands in the same relation to the social as anatomy and physiology to the physical body." The organicists have never, to my knowledge, made any use, as they might have done, of this significant passage, but it is broad enough to serve equally well in characterizing society as an organized body or social organization. But Mill was specially concerned in distinguishing his new-found science from political economy, and he proceeded to do so in a clearly worded paragraph.

The germ of this distinction was contained in a passage of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations where he says that "the interest of the dealers in any particular branch of trade or manufacture is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to,

that of the publick."(1*) This was in the nature of an admission or confession, for Adam Smith defended the utmost liberty in trade and business, and argued with great force that thus only can national prosperity be secured. It was as much his teachings as any other cause that raised up the school of economists who maintained the opposite doctrine to that above quoted, that the free and spontaneous operation of all economic processes can be depended upon under all circumstances to work for the general good of mankind. This doctrine was finally erected into a sort of economic fetish and bowed down to with implicit faith. It is still strong, but latterly certain influences have been at work which have shaken the faith of many able economists, while the social economists, and especially the sociologists, have long been taking the view above quoted from Adam Smith as their point of departure and striving to discover the broader law under which it falls in a scheme of social science.

The tincture given to all economic speculation by Bentham’s utilitarianism made the acceptance of the ideas of the Austrian school of economists, with their new definitions of value, more easy and rapid, and attention at length became turned to the question of the true nature of utility. Formerly and normally everything centered on the idea of production - goods, wealth. The new influences tended to direct thought toward consumption - men, welfare. Political economy, or economics proper, was seen to be static, while the spirit of the times demanded a dynamic science. It was than seen that considerations of production are static, while considerations of consumption are dynamic. Mill had said that "political economy has nothing to do with the consumption of wealth,"(2*) and no one surely was more competent to speak on the subject than he. The modern dynamic economists who start from the standpoint of consumption must either admit that they are not dealing with political economy, or they must admit that they have added an entirely

new department to the science, reversing in large parts its fundamental tenets. The truth of the matter is that two distinct sciences are here involved, and the fundamental distinction between them is confused. It is not merely that one deals with production and wealth, and the other with consumption and welfare, though this is true and clear enough; but the initial standpoint is the opposite in the one from what it is in the other. In political economy the point of departure is the producer, while in sociology it is the consumer. But by the producer is not meant the laborer or the artisan, but the undertaker or manager; the man interested in securing the maximum production. And by the consumer is meant all who consume, i. e., the public, society at large. Utility means the same in both, but its application is wholly different. Utility always means satisfaction, but in economics it is satisfaction to the entrepreneur, while in sociology it is satisfaction to all who use the product. But there is no necessary harmony between these two satisfactions. Economics deals with all kinds of business, and any business that remunerates those engaged in it is a success. Just as the term "production" is broadened to include exchange, transportation, and all other operations that in any way affect, or even relate to, a commodity produced,(1*) so the term "business" is expanded until it embraces all gainful pursuits that are not so clearly injurious as to be made unlawful. Many kinds of business, indeed those that are the most gainful of all, have scarcely any relation to production in the narrower sense and make no pretension to causing any improvement in the value of commodities. A very large part of the lucrative business conducted in cities is of the nature of speculation, and the idea that speculation is a form of production is simply an economic myth.(2*)

Political economy does not inquire whether a business is

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1) "Production, in fact, embraces every economic operation except consumption." - J. B. CLARK, The Distribution of Wealth, etc. (New York, 1899), p. 20.
proper or not, nor whether it is properly or even honestly conducted. For example, in the dairy business, there is no doubt that, if nobody objected, the business could be made more "successful" by putting water in the milk, and this would be no affair of the economist, even if he knew it. He is only interested in the effect it would have on the business. He might properly discuss, in a truly scientific spirit, the influence of such a proceeding upon the market, and determine with mathematical exactness just how much water "the traffic would bear." This is exactly what economists do in discussing other forms of business and in deducing the laws controlling prices. They never inquire whether prices are just. They have discovered that, according to the laws of business, which they consider to be laws of nature that an human power can alter, prices will be just as high as is necessary to secure the maximum profits, and no higher. The return to the entrepreneur is determined by two elements: the price of the commodity and the quantity sold. A larger quantity at a lower price may bring greater profits than a smaller quantity at a higher price. If the price is pushed up to the point where the consumer prefers, or is compelled, to do without or to use some cheaper substitute, the sales will fall off and the profits diminish. This is the only check to prices of certain commodities where there is nearly or quite complete monopoly. But in most cases there is, besides this, the check of competition, which, until the laws of aggressive competition were understood, was supposed to keep prices down. It is now known that it tends rather to raise them. But, whatever may be the effects of all these causes, the economist only considers these alleged perfect and unchangeable laws of trade. If the price is three or four times the cost of production, this is looked upon as inevitable. The same is true of rates of transportation, whether of passengers or freight, and, in fact, of all forms of business. The consumer must always pay "all the traffic will bear." The economist is not troubled by any of the moral aspects of the case. That is the affair of the state, or of government. The dilution of the milk only enters into his calculation as an element of profit or loss. So also of all forms of
adulteration or vitiation of goods. The amount of chicory that can be mixed with coffee to adapt the price to a certain class of customers; the sale of oleomargarine for butter; the use of alum in making bread; and, in short, the almost unlimited number of devices resorted to in nearly all departments of business, to cheapen everything, which dealers openly confess that they are compelled to do under pain of failure in business - all this is the legitimate study of the economist from the sole standpoint of the business man.

The sociologist takes an entirely different and exactly opposite view of all these cases. He says that, if the laws of business do not automatically compel the dairyman to omit the water from his milk entirely and deal in the pure article, there is something wrong about the laws of business. He reasons that when man first set about occupying this planet there were innumerable laws of nature working against him, and he commenced by little and little to counteract and control these laws; first to render them harmless, and than to make them useful to him, until at last he has succeeded in practically mastering the "laws of nature," and in utilizing everything within his reach. It does not seem to the sociologist probable that, while nearly all physical forces, and many vital and psychic forces, especially in animals and plants, can be thus subjugated to his needs, there is a class of forces and laws called economic that are hopelessly beyond his reach. He cannot see why, if such laws and forces are not working to his advantage, they may not, when thoroughly, understood, be controlled as the others have been, and rendered innocuous at least, or perhaps utilized to man's general advantage.

Mention might perhaps be made of another very successful kind of business, though classed as a learned profession, viz., the practice of law; and closely associated with it are a thousand little businesses that require expert legal knowledge. The system of jurisprudence that has grown up in civilized societies, the purpose of which is to cause security of person and property, is one of the richest heritages of the past, but it has come to employ a much greater number of persons than are necessary.
Probably all the law business of any country could be done by one-fourth of the present number. The rest are simply parasites. The way in which they maintain their hold on society is through that other business called politics. Most politicians are lawyers, and this is chiefly due to the facility they acquire in public speaking by their practice before the bar. Business men (merchants, manufacturers, railroad officials, etc.) have no opportunity to speak in public, and therefore, however good their judgment may be on public questions, they cannot attract the attention of the people in such a way as to become prominent in political affairs and get themselves sent to legislatures, to parliament, to congress, etc. The result is that legislatures always consist chiefly of lawyers. Nothing more natural than that bodies of lawyers, having the framing of all laws in their hands, should so frame them as to increase the amount of their own business. This, in brief, explains the superfluous law business of the world, which not only produces nothing in any economic sense of the word, but becomes a great charge and expense, and actually diminishes the degree of security by all manner of fictions and useless technicalities.

Now, respecting these non-productive, parasitic, and even injurious employments, economics has nothing to say except simply to consider whether they are successful. All kinds of business are equally legitimate, and even those which the state condemns as dishonest or pernicious are never suppressed at the suggestion of the political economist. So long as they are tolerated they are proper subjects of economic study, and we know that there is great diversity among states as to what forms of business should be prohibited, as witness legislation relative to lotteries.

Sociology, on the other hand, in its applied stage, concerns itself primarily with the question of the public utility of enterprises. Its standpoint is the good of society. To that end the individual manager of a business may be sacrificed, or, at least, he may be constrained to direct his energies and abilities into some useful channel. The modern interest in sociology is chiefly due to the obvious sterility of political economy. The social
world is in a somewhat troubled state. The era of machinofacture has culminated in such an array of labor-saving inventions that the possibilities of production are well-nigh unlimited, but the capital has become concentrated in relatively few hands, while the artisan class has not acquired the general intelligence necessary to enable them to participate in such a movement. Thus enormous relative inequalities have grown up in modern society. At the same time these very causes have accelerated rather than retarded the rise of the proletariat, and improved the absolute, though not the relative, material condition of the working classes. In a word, they have engendered discontent, which is a state that can only exist above a certain stage of physical and mental advancement. Society, though not in a dangerous condition, is in a sort of ferment, and there has been made possible a social problem, or rather a crowd of social problems. At first appeal was made to the economist, who was supposed to be able to offer a scientific solution of some of these problems. But his answers, though sometimes oracular in form, were about as satisfactory as the opinions of a certain J. Bunsby. More frequently he grew impatient and reiterated the traditional economic injunction against presuming to meddle with the workings of natural law. Many anxious inquirers, wholly discouraged by these cold blasts from high seats of learning, turn to the state and demand a statutory solution of social problems, but the state usually declines to respond, or perhaps adopts measures that fail to accomplish the purpose sought, or even aggravate the difficulties. It is under such a condition of affairs that there has been gradually struggling into existence a new science which seeks a true and fundamental acquaintance with, rather than an immediate solution of, social questions; which is content to wait for such solution until the conditions of these questions are better understood. It does not hold them in haughty disdain, nor does it pretend to possess my panacea for social evils, but it is open to inquiry, takes a true scientific interest in social events and phenomena for their own sake, and either inhibits its concern for the practical results, or has faith that these will be best subserved
by first laying in a store of knowledge. This science is sociology, and there is enough of intellectual
stimulus in the study of its pure stage, wholly disconnected from its consequences, to keep quite a
corps of earnest investigators in the field working on different lines.
But it is obvious at a glance that this science is much broader than that of political economy, even
when that is expanded to embrace what is called political science (finance, administration,
diplomacy, national enterprises, consular affairs, colonial relations, etc., etc.). These are all related
to it, in fact may be included in it, but they do not by any means constitute the whole of it. Relatively
to the whole domain of sociology, these are really quite narrow, and it is only their vital character
that causes them to appear so all-absorbing.

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[To be continued.]
V. SOCIOLOGY AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

It is maintained by some that there is nothing new in sociology; that it is simply a new name for that which has long been called the philosophy of history; that human events make up its basis of fact; and that the only scientific treatment possible is the co-ordination of those facts and the tracing of their dependence, their antecedence and sequence - in short, their causal relations. Some color is given to this view by Comte's masterly summing up, under the head of social dynamics, of the course of history through the celebrated *trois états* in the fifth and sixth volumes of his *Positive Philosophy*. Dr. Paul Barth, in the suggestive work already referred to, entitled *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, lays stress on this fact, and promises in a second part of his work to justify more fully its title. But in the first part, devoted to a review of sociological literature, he has certainly increased the difficulty of his task by enumerating the facts and principles furnished by biology, psychology, anthropology, and many other departments widely separated from human history.

Comte was deeply impressed with the necessity of connecting the events of history together into such a series that their future occurrence could be predicted from the past. He says:

1) "These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass of an essay like the present to give even a faint conception of the extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be made a science should suspend his judgment until he has read these volumes of M. Comte." - JOHN STUART MILL, *Westminster Review*, Vol. LXXXIII (N. S., Vol. XXVII), April 1, 1865, pp. 396, 397; *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (bound with *Later Speculations of M. Comte*), 1st American, from and uniform with 3d London ed. (Philadelphia, 1866), p. 106.
It is undeniable ... that history has not yet ceased to possess an essentially literary or descriptive character, and has not acquired a true scientific character by finally establishing a rational filiation in the succession of social events, so as to permit, as in other departments of phenomena, and within the general limits imposed by their higher complexity, a certain systematic prevision of their further succession. (1*)

He does not characterize as philosophy of history the fifth and sixth volumes of his *Positive Philosophy*, but on the title-page, and also in the preface of the third volume, of his *Positive Polity*, “containing the social dynamics or general treatment of human progress,” he adds the words: “Philosophie de l’histoire.” But he does not imply that that one volume constitutes the whole of sociology. In fact, he always made sociology exactly synonymous with “social physics,” which embraces social statics as well as social dynamics, and no one has attempted to identify social statics with the philosophy of history. Nevertheless, Barth, who is perfectly familiar with Comte, says that “a perfect sociology would be exactly coextensive with the philosophy of history; they differ at bottom only in name.” (2*) It is curious that Lilienfeld, (3*) whose standpoint is so strictly biological, should accept this view of Barth, but he says that it can only be realized through the application of the organic method. He is probably alone in being able to see any rational connection between the two methods. Tarde, on the other hand, declares that “it was not sociology that Comte founded; it is a simple philosophy of history that he offers us under this name, but admirably drawn up; it is the last word of the philosophy of history.” (4*) And De Greef, much to the same effect, remarks that “the sociology of Comte does not, properly speaking, merit that title; it is rather a philosophy of the history of ideas.” (5*) All such statements result from the tendency to ignore everything else in Comte’s sociology but his historical review of human thought through the three stages: theological, metaphysical, and positive. Those writers forget that

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Comte insisted that sociology was simply the last of a series of affiliated sciences, and as such virtually embraced them all. If they would read again the fourth volume of the *Positive Philosophy*, "containing the dogmatic part of social philosophy" (see title-page), they would discover how much broader Comte's sociology was than they seem to suppose.

Tarde has given his idea of the difference between sociology and the philosophy of history in the following terms:

The philosophy of history, as it is understood from Bossuet - so much admired by Comte - to Hegel and his French disciples, is wholly different from sociology. The latter pretends to formulate laws of formation or development applicable to all societies real or possible, considered primarily as independent of one another and separately evolving. But the philosophy of history relates only to the known societies, indeed, only to the small number of these latter that form a continuous chain from Egypt and Chaldea, through Greece and Rome, to modern Europe.\(^1\)

It is, of course, natural and proper that sociology should deal mainly with the line of leading civilizations and races, because these represent the last and highest stages of culture and civilization, and present the most complex and difficult phenomena for investigation. They also possess a far greater practical interest than the outlying and more backward races and civilizations. Comte laid stress upon this as the final goal of the science, and he did not treat uncivilized and savage races, leaving us to infer that his acquaintance with anthropology was limited. I regard this as one of the great merits of his work, because, as was remarked in the first paper of this series, the temptation is so strong to permit the treatment of the lower races to adsorb all attention, and thus narrow sociology down to mere anthropology.

Dr. Georg Simmel has also attempted to draw the line between sociology and the philosophy of history. He says:

This special task of sociology must be separated strictly from the philosophy of history. The philosophy of history seeks to bring historical facts, external as well as psychical, in their entirety, under general concepts, by virtue of which history may satisfy certain demands, ethical, metaphysical, religious, and artistic. In complete opposition to this, sociology as a special

\(^1\) Revue internationale de sociologie, septième année, 1899, pp. 456, 457.
science, the eventual scope of which I have attempted here to determine, restricts itself entirely to the realm of phenomena and their immediate psychological explanation.\(^{(1)}\)

Dr. Ludwig Stein states the distinction as follows:

Sociology is distinguished from the philosophy of history not less in its method than in its aims, by sharply drawn lines. It of course shares with the philosophy of history the problem - the development of society - but not its methods of solving it. If, for example, the philosophy of history in its course thus far has proceeded to construct deductively, sociology seeks first to collect together all the empirical facts of social life to scientific investigation and then to sift them in order finally to describe in a logical inductive system the totally of all social facts within the range of human experience.\(^{(2)}\)

Finally might be cited the now somewhat classic reply of Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury) to the declaration of Fustel de Coulanges that sociology is the same thing as history, "the science of social acts":

I can scarcely think that these two words can be employed as synonyms. In some respects history means more than sociology. Accidents, successions, dynasties, can scarcely enter into sociology; while the discussion of questions concerning education, health, the condition of the poor, and many other circumstances that contribute in large measure to the prosperity and well-being of mankind, have not formed, so to speak, any part of history, at least down to the present time.

There are then portions of history that do not enter into the domain of sociology, and questions of sociology that do not enter into that of history. How sad it is that historians have so neglected the social side of history! We find pages and even chapters devoted to wars, battles, and struggles for power, while the social condition of the people is entirely omitted, or treated in a phrase or two.

It is said: "happy is the people that has no history." No history? There cannot be a people without a history. It may be that history will consist of the development and of the quiet and silent growth of a people; but that is none the less a history, and it is for this very reason the more instructive and more interesting.\(^{(3)}\)

This might be fittingly supplemented by the comment of

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\(^{(2)}\) Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie (Stuttgart, 1897), p. 24.

M. Alfred Fouillée, another president of the same institute, who says:

Sir John Lubbock is right; only one may say that he himself seems to absorb sociology too much in its concrete applications, in what are called "social questions," i. e., in the economic condition of the people. Sociology properly so called studies, as we have seen, the laws themselves and the ends of life in society, the forms that this life may take on, and the succession of these forms. It asks for light from history, from political economy, and from jurisprudence, but in order to give it back to them in turn, and especially to give them unity of principle, of method, and of aim. Sociology is then a science apart; it is no more to be confounded with history than mechanics is to be confounded with the description of the various states of the heavens at various cosmographic epochs.\(^1\)

VI. SOCIOLOGY AS THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES.

It is maintained by some that sociology is not a science in the proper sense, but simply a term employed to embrace a large group of more or less cognate sciences or subjects that are separately referred to as special social sciences. On this view all of these sciences together constitute sociology, and each of them belongs to it, but there is no implication of any organic relation among the special social sciences, or of anything in sociology that is distinct from them or peculiar to itself. Although these various sciences or groups of phenomena are admitted to be interrelated in various ways and degrees, there is no special way in which they are conceived as related to sociology, which may be looked upon as merely a mechanical mixture of them all. We will first inquire what are the principal special social sciences thus conceived as together constituting sociology. The following enumeration of the so-called special social sciences includes such as I have casually noted in the course of my reading, and does not pretend to be complete, rational, or methodical. The passages have been noted, and the references might have been given if their importance had warranted the space they would occupy. I give the list thus in extenso, merely to show how wide a range has been given to sociology by a large number of writers. As will be seen, it

\(^1\) Le mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du monde (Paris, 1896), pp. 234, 235.
practically covers all science and all knowledge, the particular ones omitted merely representing the
defectiveness of the record, which the reader can doubtless complete. To make this more clear I
have attempted a rough classification based primarily on the accepted order of increasing
complexity of the sciences, but necessarily losing much of this character when the higher and more
aberrant groups are reached. Many of the terms used are virtually synonymous, but, as some might
see differences of meaning or application, I give many such as I find them. Wherever there is a
clear subordination it is indicated by indenting those that apparently stand under others of the same
more general group. I have also indicated the synonyms by indenting them, which will not probably
lead to any confusion.

THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES.

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Without commenting on this list, with all its crudities and even absurdities, it may be frankly admitted that the fields of knowledge that it covers embrace practically all that sociology can have to deal with. It is obvious that there could be no sociology until the greater number of these fields had been cultivated. It may even be admitted - and I for one would strongly insist upon it - that sociology cannot be properly studied without a fundamental acquaintance with those more general sciences that I have put at the head of the list. And their utility for the sociologist increases as the fields grow more complex, until biology, anthropology, and psychology become absolutely indispensable.

What, then, is the relation of the special social sciences to sociology? Schaeffle calls them the building stones out of which sociology is constructed. But this is a very rough, if not entirely erroneous, comparison. Sociology is not exactly a structure built of these materials. It is rather a generalization from them all. It abstracts from each all that is common and form a sort of head, to which they constitute, as it were, the body and limbs. In short, sociology is an integration or synthesis of the whole body of social sciences. Wundt has set forth this distinction very clearly, referring everything to the special social sciences, except the general conceptions and principles...
of social life.\(^{1*}\) For my own part I prefer to see in the special social sciences the *data* of sociology. They furnish the facts, and sociology co-ordinates them. Many of them furnish great co-ordinated groups of facts and special laws well established in their own domains. Sociology treats these as units, and groups these groups into higher and more general conceptions. Sociology furnishes the highest of all generalizations. It is an abstract science, dealing with the laws and principles of all the other sciences. It stands at the summit of the hierarchy of the sciences, and derives its truths from the entire series with increasing directness from physics and chemistry to biology and psychology. It can be properly understood only when considered from this point of view, and it should not be taught until regularly reached in this natural order of the sciences. In teaching it, therefore, anthropology and history, psychology and biology, and *a fortiori* the simpler branches of a common education, should be assumed as the necessary preparation supposed to have been made. The teacher can then proceed direct to principles. Without such preparation he must stop at every step and actually teach these ancillary sciences before he can begin his instruction in sociology proper. I would furthermore accept practically all the disciplines enumerated in the list as special social sciences, although their relation to sociology is of a widely varying character. There is, however, one which many regard as a science co-ordinate with sociology, and which the two leading sociologists of the world, Comte and Spencer, have actually placed above that science in the natural sequence of sciences. I refer, of course, to ethics. I have never been able to share this view, and I consider ethics rather a typical social science, in so far as it is a science at all. In the first place, the ethical idea is essentially and necessarily social. It always implies a feeling creature as the recipient of the action, whether good or bad. Its basis is sympathy or altruism, either of which terms requires at least a duality of persons so related or associated as to exert an influence upon each other. There can be no sympathy without someone to

\(^{1}\) Logik, zweite Auflage, Bd. II, Abth. II, pp. 438 (footnote), 447.
feel with. There can be no altruism without an alter. This seems effectually to dispose of Spencer's claim to a distinct science of ethics. In the second place, it is hard to make anyone see that Comte's morale was practically identical with sociability, and as such was simply an extension or special amplification of his general conception of sociology. But anyone who will carefully examine his Politique positive from this point of view cannot fail to be struck with this fact. Here we find no moralizing, no flourishing of ethical precepts, no hortatory appeals to the moral sense, no laudation of moral conduct; in fact, nothing that at all resembles the current treatises on ethics, or "moral science," as a code of action designed to restrain evil-doing and encourage well-doing. Instead of this we find a scientific treatise on the evolution of altruism through sociability. It is in its earliest stages that this is most clear, and with primitive man, as all know, the ethical sense was confined to the nearest of kin. We must come down to very advanced nations to find the recognition of any distinct moral obligation toward the members of other nations and races. The anthropologists have clearly seen this, and they have considerable difficulty in distinguishing the moral from the social.(1*) M. E. de Roberty,(2)* one of the most enlightened followers of Comte, has ably and fully elaborated this view. It is, in fact, the "social consensus" of Comte and the "solidarity" of current sociological literature, and it all rests on sociability, or a certain mutual interest which the members of society take in one another. This is the root of altruism and of all ethics, and is an exclusively social sentiment.

The conception of sociology as consisting of all the special social sciences unaccompanied by any idea of their relations is of course an extreme one, and could not be entertained by anyone who recognized as special social sciences all those enumerated in the above list. Those who thus think of sociology do so in a vague way and have in mind only a few of the related

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2) Le bien et le mal (Paris, 1896), passim.
sciences. Nevertheless the number of such persons is very large, while the number of those who think closely and carefully on the subject is small. Hence it seemed worth while to devote a little space to this somewhat popular view. It may be well, before leaving the subject, to advert to the opposite extreme, which is also somewhat prevalent. When any one subject is allowed to engross the mind, it is apt to assume undue prominence and engender extreme views with regard to it. Even sociology may become in some minds a sort of fetish. This tendency is seen in what may be called the objectivation of social phenomena. Too much is often made of the social consciousness, and society itself seems to be conceived by some as a sort of independent being or entity. Mr. Spencer did good service in checking this tendency by laying special stress on the fact that the fundamental distinction between society and an organism is that the former is incapable of enjoyment or suffering, and exists only for the good of its individual members, each of which is thus capable. Attacks on the social order are to be deprecated, not because it is possible to hurt the social order as a feeling creature, but because any disturbance of the social order reacts upon the individual who is a feeling creature. No one has ever, to my knowledge, questioned this proposition, and it is really little more than a truism.

Professor Émile Durkheim, of the University of Bordeaux, has made the largest claims for sociology as a science sui generis and for the fundamental difference between social phenomena and those of any other class. His views have been severely attacked by Tarde and others, and the discussion has proved very fruitful. This is not the place to enter into it, nor do I think it worth while to do so at all. There is a basis of truth in Durkheim's position, which is not altogether new. Whether we consider the relation of society to its units or of sociology to the special social sciences, there can be no doubt that the analogy which he uses of a chemical compound as distinguished from a mechanical mixture is the most instructive that has been adduced. But Spencer used it long ago and in a much broader sense, and it had doubtless been used by others before him. Certainly
many, including myself, have made much of it for many years. I merely mention it here in order to
say that this really important question which involves it belongs to a large class and can best be
treated in another place where it is appropriate to deal with all the rest.

**VII. SOCIOLOGY AS THE DESCRIPTION OF SOCIAL FACTS.**

The idea that science consists in the description of facts, or in the accumulation of a mass of facts,
is a very common one, not only as a popular notion, but else among specialists in many branches,
especially in the field of biology, formerly called "natural history." In my early botanical experience I
was impressed with the fact that the botanists I knew cared chiefly for collecting all the plants in any
locality and making a catalogue of them. That was their idea of botany as a science. Things are
changed now, and most botanists are more interested in the morphological and histological study of
plants. But in this they often become absorbed in the study of some special organ or kind of tissue,
and look upon the microscopic observation of certain minute structures and their exhaustive
description as constituting the science. It is evidently the same in zoology. I do not say that either of
these methods is not scientific. Both are necessary to the progress of science, but neither in and of
itself advances science. It is not until some competent investigator takes up the isolated results thus
attained, and brings them together into some orderly connection and constructs some kind of
system, that any scientific truth is established. For science does not consist in facts, but in their
relations, and these can be made known only by reasoning about the facts first collected, observed,
and described.

It is not, therefore, surprising that there should be sociologists who look upon the collection and
description of facts as constituting sociology. This would result from the nature of the human mind, if
there were no other cause. The two opposite types of mind, the analytic and the synthetic, have
been described by many philosophers. Naturalists are divided by this principle into two opposing
camps; for, although all must
observe, describe, and classify, the one class, impressed by the differences in things and the multiplicity of facts in nature, tend to divide and subdivide and multiply species and groups, while the other, embarrassed by the resemblances and common characters that they see among all objects, tend to combine and merge their species and groups and reduce their number. The former are called "splitters" and the latter "lumpers," and these follow each other over every field of science, each undoing the work of the other in the matter of classification. To outsiders this seems to lead to utter confusion, but in practice it really causes little inconvenience.

Most of the "descriptive sociology" that has been done and of that which has been recommended properly belongs to anthropology, i.e., to ethnography. There it is of the highest value to the sociologist as furnishing the data for sociology. The plan of monographing the acts of family life of the lower classes in civilized society, as pursued by Le Play and his school, belongs to sociology, or perhaps to demography. The very thought of making it universal or sufficiently extensive to form a reliable guide to the sociologist is appalling, and I have yet to learn of any important use that sociologists have been able to make of the work that has been done thus far. Most of the rest of the materials available for sociology are derived from history. History is the sociologist's great storehouse, and it cannot be said that the resources are meager. Next to fiction, history probably forms the largest department of literature. It is, of course, justly charged that history does not furnish all that the sociologist demands and requires. This is no modern discovery. Condorcet, writing in 1795 or earlier, said:

Thus far political history, as well as that of philosophy and of science, has only been the history of a few men; that which really forms the human species, the mass of families who subsist almost entirely by their labor, has been forgotten.(1*)

The note thus sounded has been re-echoed all through the nineteenth century, until the "great-man theory" and histoire-bataille have come to describe what has hitherto usually passed

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1) Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain (Paris, 1900), p. 158.
for history. But in its stead has arisen the "historical school" of economists, and no one can deny
that this school is furnishing the real materials for sociology, so far as they can be gleaned from
history and literature. Sociologists are already using them, and will use them more and more. I have
sometimes thought that more could be extracted from literature than is commonly supposed. If
sociologists would go about it in some such way as Mr. Spencer accomplished his Descriptive
Sociology, important results could be attained. If the early literature, like that of Greece and Rome,
of India, Egypt, Persia, Syria, and China, could be thoroughly sifted for social facts, the labor,
though great, would be well repaid. Such writers did not intentionally inform the world as to the
industrial, economic, and social condition of the ages and countries in which they lived and wrote
but on every page occur words that are full of meaning for the sociologist who will carefully weigh
them and learn what they imply. The same would be true of the sagas and numerous traditional
poems that have come down to us, such as the Nibelungen Lied, the Ossian Tales, the Kalevala,
and the HELIAND, as well as the oriental Mahabharata and Shah-Namah, the Indian Vedas, the
Persian Avesta, and other sacred books. Some praiseworthy attempts in this general direction have
already been made, such, for example, as De Greef's Croyances et doctrines politiques and
Transformisme social, and Coste's Expérience des peuples et les prévisions qu'elle autorise.
M. René Worms has proposed a form of descriptive sociology which is an advance upon that of
Herbert Spencer.(1*) It relates to advanced societies as well as to the uncivilized races, and looks
to the present as well as to the past. It thus leads naturally to the next stage in the study of society,
which he properly calls comparative sociology.
The next great reservoir of social facts, after ethnography and history, is statistics. This branch is
being pushed with great energy, and often has the resources of great states behind it. It only needs
to be wisely directed, and it will prove of inestimable value to the sociologist.

But there is still another source of social facts, as yet without a name, but always taken into account, and which is perhaps of more value to the sociologist than any of the foregoing. This is the sociologist's own social environment. If he would only recognize it, the facts he is seeking lie all about him. From birth to death he is literally bathed in a social medium and breathes a social atmosphere. In some respects sociology is at a disadvantage in having men for its subjects. It has some difficulty in collecting specimens, and more in taking them to pieces for analysis, though even these things are accomplished; but it has this great advantage that it never lacks for material. It does not have to go in search of subjects for study. On every hand they are always present. Neither are they shy or wild, so that it is necessary to trap or shoot them in order to get near enough to them to make close observations. Ornithologists and other zoologists often strive to conceal themselves and bait their birds and animals, so that they can be observed in their natural condition, or they employ the field-glass to bring them nearer to them, but this is attended with great difficulties and requires patience and skill. But the sociologist can always observe men from as close range as he pleases, and see them acting naturally and without fear or constraint.

No sociologist realizes how much use he unconsciously makes of his social environment. He not only studies the objects and the facts and phenomena of society in this way, but he is able to study the laws and principles of social life, and work out the finest theories of social action in the highest domains of psychic and spiritual activity. Kant, who never quitted Königsberg, could probe to the bottom the deepest problems of thought and conduct. A sociologist scarcely need travel to prosecute his researches. With a library of books he can learn what men have done in the past. His newspaper tells him what they are doing a present in all parts of the world. In his family, neighborhood, town, or city he daily meets man, and he has learned that men are fundamentally alike the world over and in all ages. It is, of course, better that he travel, and
the more the better, provided he do not subordinate his reflective to his perceptive faculties. But sociology may almost be made a closet study, and the sociologist may study society in narrow surroundings, just as some truly great naturalists have practically spent their lives in their cabinets. Sociology, therefore, in its more restricted and proper sense, is of all sciences perhaps the least to be regarded as a descriptive science. This is not because it ignores facts. It uses far more facts than any other science. But it is because its facts are supplied by other ancillary special social sciences - ethnography, demography, history, statistics, and the ever-present social environment, which might be called mesography when it is observed, recorded, and utilized by the sociologist. It is the special province of the sociologist to use these multitudinous resources and materials, and to construct the social system. It is induction on a vast scale, accompanied, as all induction always is, by sound deduction, or reasoning and interpretation. It is an abstract science in one sense, but not in the sense of dispensing with concrete facts, since all its results are derived from the study of concrete facts and of the relations that subsist among them. M. de Roberty holds that sociology is essentially a descriptive science, while at the same time claiming that it is an abstract science. I am unable to understand this, as it seems rather to be a contradiction of terms. He most use both words in some special sense peculiar to his own philosophy, with which in its main aspects I find myself in full accord. But here I would agree with Cosentini that "to stop at the descriptive stage is to condemn the science to remaining in a rudimentary state."(1*) Sociology is an organizing, generalizing, co-ordinating science, calculated to extract social truths from social facts. Facts, in and of themselves, are of little value, and may even impede the progress of science. "Though there must be data before there can be generalization, yet ungeneralized data, accumulated in excess, are impediments to generalization."(2*) But observation and reasoning must always be combined in order to

1) Revue internationale de sociologie, June, 1898, p. 432.
be fruitful. "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer; Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind."(1) "Il n'existe aucune séparation absolute entre observer et raisonner."(2) In the scientific world the accumulation of facts has outstripped the work of valid generalization. For while men of moderate ability can observe, experiment, and multiply details in special departments, it requires men of breadth to arrange them into groups, to educe principles, and arrive at comprehensive laws."(3) But the facts that the sociologist is to use should be verified and ascertained to be true and reliable; otherwise, no one need be told, they are worse than no facts at all. The unreliability of the accounts of travelers among uncivilized races of man has been emphasized again and again. Condorcet, a little later on in the same passage that I have quoted, refers to it and gives most of the reasons why it is so. How much of Spencer's Descriptive Sociology can be depended upon? One would suppose that accounts of civilized peoples given by persons from other civilized countries who go among them would contain no serious error. Yet everybody knows that this is not the case. Only such exceptional observers as de Tocqueville or James Bryce have ever accurately described American affairs. I have recently had this fact forcibly brought home to me in reading Vaccaro's Bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état, a work that contains much that is of the highest value to the sociologist. But toward the close the author essays to support his conclusions by appealing to facts, and lays several countries under contribution, and especially the United States. Nearly every statement in his chapter on democracy in America (pp. 409-26) is false in fact, and a large part of the chapter is stupid and ridiculous. I am no apologist of the political system of this country, and any American sociologist could have furnished him with facts that no one could challenge, better adapted to sustain his contention than the false statements he makes. After reading this, my faith in all accounts of foreign countries of which I have no personal knowledge was

1) KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1868), p. 82.
3) E. L. YOUmans, Popular Science Monthly, November 1874, Vol. VI, p. 44.
completely shaken. If an Italian (or a Frenchman, for it is such a person whom he so unquestioningly quotes) cannot give a more correct account of what is going on in America than what we have here, how much dependence can we place in what we are told about China or Japan, or India? And if it is so difficult to observe contemporary social phenomena, what shall we say of phenomena of past ages as embodied in human history? Are the social facts that the sociologist can command sufficiently reliable to be trusted and built upon? And, if not, what criterion of truth shall we apply in our materials? Of course, we should verify them if possible, but in the majority of cases it is not possible. The only test in such cases, if they are to be used at all, seems to be their inherent reasonableness. If they are at all anomalous or contrary to what we know of the laws governing human action and human thought, they are to be doubted and rejected. But this knowledge of "human nature" we derive mainly from the social environment, so that ethnography, demography, history, and even statistics must be made to square with the teachings of social mesography. It is, I repeat, truth rather than fact that is demanded. In a certain sense, fiction is more reliable than history. If the author of a work of fiction is a true artist, he sees certain great social truths and proceeds to bring them out in the strongest possible light. He does not pretend that his facts are true. He realizes, as does the reader, that it is of no consequence whether such and such characters, with the names he gives them, really lived or not, or whether the particular events, so graphically described, actually took place. No one supposes that they did. I have known narrow-minded people who condemned all fiction as a bundle of lies. But the world has always recognized that the accurate portrayal of human life and character is truth, and that names and events are of no consequence.

The general conclusion under this head is that sociology does not consist in the description of social facts, which belongs to subordinate sciences; that it is not a descriptive science, but a constructive science; that its method is not chiefly analytic, but synthetic. At the same time it must not be forgotten that all relations are either between primary concrete facts or else between
other such relations, so that it is never safe to take a new step in generalization until every previous step in the series of combinations upon which it rests has been thoroughly tested.

**VIII. SOCIOLOGY AS ASSOCIATION.**

By omitting the word "human" I make this conception broad enough to include what has been called animal sociology, upon which many so strongly insist. I have no objection to the expression except as tending to confound what seem to me to be two generically distinct things. M. Espinas has done most excellent service in bringing together into a compact form the numerous facts recorded in many obscure places by naturalists in all departments bearing upon animal association. He has also added much from his own observation, and he has enriched his work by an introduction dealing with the broadest aspects of the subject, including its relation to human association. The treatment is of the most enlightened character, and its author cannot be classed among those who maintain that there is a regular gradation or series of very short steps leading all the way from the lowest colonies or chains of animals to the highest human societies. Hobbes naturally denied all similarity between animal and human societies. Comte saw the resemblance, but said that animal operations were purely statical, while those of men were also dynamic. (1) Espinas shows how this is. (2) The real distinction is that animals do not transform the environment in a permanent way in their own interest. This subject is too large to be discussed here, but the basis of it all is the difference between instinct and reason. Even if we admit with Espinas, and indeed most clear thinkers, that instinct has the germs of reason at its base, still, for all practical purposes, and in their general results, they must be regarded as distinct; hence the fundamental distinction between human and animal societies.

Next as to the principles upon which association rests. There are a number of them, some merely biological, as in the transition from the Protozoa to the Metazoa, the laws of seg-

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mentation, and the entire philosophy of the composite animal body. These we need not discuss. The association of the higher organisms takes place under psychic laws. The phenomena are complex, but there are two principal causes, the one connected with feeling, the other with reason; but these usually or always work together, and can be separated only in thought for purposes of analysis. These principles are, respectively, the consciousness of kind and the survival of the social. 

Consciousness of kind. - I adopt Professor Giddings's phrase as probably the clearest and most euphonious, at least in the English language, that has been proposed. The conception is a very old one, and perhaps I cannot better illustrate it than by quoting a few of the authors who have given more or less distinct expression to it. It means that there is a natural bond that draws like toward like. The Greeks were well aware of this, but neither had they failed to discover that there is also a mysterious charm that mutually attracts the unlike, and they discussed both these facts. The attraction of unlikes they could not, of course, understand, because it required a knowledge of hereditary intercrossing aided by natural selection to explain it. But the more common fact of the mutual attraction of the similar seemed natural, and Aristotle mentions it.(1*) Such old adages as, "Birds of a feather flock together," and "Like seeks like," have come down to us from antiquity. That galaxy of contemporaries of the eighteenth century, Hume, Ferguson, and Adam Smith, were all interested in this and kindred questions, and Professor Giddings, in the preface to the third edition of his Principles of Sociology (p. x), admits that he derived the suggestion that grew into the conception of the consciousness of kind from Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments. Hume has put himself still more clearly on record as follows:

In all creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there appears a remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without any advantages they can ever propose to reap from their union. This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the

1) Nichomachean Ethics, Book VIII, chap. i (''τὰν δημοίν φασίν ὰ τον δημοιν, καὶ κοιλοίν ποτὶ κοιλοίν''
creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages.(1*)

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his Social Statics, published in 1850, calls attention to Adam Smith's treatment of this subject in his Theory of the Moral Sentiments, and says:

It is the aim of that work to show that the proper regulation of our conduct to one another is secured by means of a faculty whose function it is to excite in each being the emotions displayed by surrounding ones - a faculty which awakens a like state of sentiment, or, as he terms it, "a fellow-feeling with the passion of others" - the faculty, in short, which we commonly call Sympathy.(2*)

Considerable more to the same general effect occurs in the closing chapter of the work entitled General Considerations. In the second volume of his Principles of Psychology he returns to the subject and says:

Sociality having thus commenced, and survival of the fittest tending ever to maintain and increase it, it will be further strengthened by the inherited effects of habit. The perception of kindred beings, perpetually seen, heard, and smelt, will come to form a predominant part of consciousness - so predominant a part that absence of it will inevitably cause discomfort. .... Without further evidence we may safely infer that among creatures led step by step into gregariousness, there will little by little be established a pleasure in being together - a pleasure in the consciousness of one another's presence - a pleasure simpler than, and quite distinct from, those higher ones which it makes possible.(3*)

M. Alfred Espinas, in his classical work on Animal Societies, originally prepared as his doctor's thesis, the first edition of which appeared in 1877, after having suffered badly at the hands of his inappreciative judges, had to meet this question on the threshold of his studies, and he has expressed himself very fully in numerous passages. I possess the second edition of 1878, received from the author's hand and now very rare, in which the highly philosophical and critical introduction, suppressed in the first edition, is restored, and from which the following quotations are taken. In a footnote on p. 173 he says:

2) Social Statics Abridged and Revised, etc. (New York, 1892), p. 49.
It will be seen that we shall distinguish later on two principal causes that co-operate in the formation of societies: interest or utility more or less clearly felt, i.e., the instinct of self-preservation on the one hand, and on the other sympathy. Here, in accidental societies, it is interest which seems to play the preponderant rôle; sympathy only consolidates the bonds which it has established. It also prevents societies from being formed among all kinds of creatures. Only those unite in a close and permanent way, among those who have an interest in doing so, that are capable of experiencing sympathy for one another. Otherwise we should see the strangest associations.

As regards normal societies, among animals of the room species, we have thought it necessary to give the first place to sympathy in the explanations that we have attempted, admitting the instinct of preservation only as an element that consolidates them. Indeed, sympathy has no other raison d'être than its future utility, although unknown to the beings that feel themselves thus drawn toward one another.

He uses the term "peuplade" for the fully formed social group of animals, and says (p. 470):

The true unit (élément) of the peuplade is the individual; and the love of a creature for its fellow-creatures (semblables) because they are such, or sympathy, is here the source of the collective consciousness.

On p. 475 he says:

It is then a pleasure for any living creature to have present around it creatures similar to itself, and this pleasure frequently felt cannot fail to create a need.

Again, on p. 545 he remarks:

But to love one another in their own image is to love all those who bear it, all those at least in which it can be recognized; all the members of the peuplade then form a part of the ego (moi) of each one, or, rather, there is no distinct me for them, there is only an us. Thus the evolution of the social sentiments is essentially a gradual transformation of egoism into altruism, or of the love of me into the love of us.

"L'attraction du même au même" is one of M. Espinas's favorite expressions. As it was he, in collaboration with M. Th. Ribot, who translated the Principles of Psychology into French, he was of course thoroughly imbued with Mr. Spencer's ideas.

Mr. Walter Bagehot's definition of a nation is quite à propos of the present discussion. It is as follows:

A nation means a like [italics his] body of men, because of that likeness
capable of acting together, and because of that likeness inclining to obey similar rules.(1*)

Gumplowicz clearly recognized the sentiment in his Struggle of Races, but he regarded it as derivative or acquired as a product of the struggle. He says of it as the basis of his Syngenism:

What now can be the cause of syngenism as an objective phenomenon that meets us in life and in history? Evidently only a feeling on the part of the individuals by virtue of which they feel themselves more strongly drawn and more closely attached to one group of men than to other groups of men.(2*)

From the above citations, which it would be easy to multiply, it must be apparent that "consciousness of kind" is an old and familiar conception, and has only gained at professor Giddings's bonds a certain precision due to a euphonious expression, the distinctive character of which, however, is lost by translation into any other language. The German Gattungsbewusstsein, Gattungsempfindung, are like other German agglutinations, while the French conscience d'espèce, conscience de l'espèce, are wholly characterless. Tarde endeavors to identify it with esprit de corps,(3*) which would be equally euphonious with "consciousness of kind," but that phrase less acquired a somewhat different and less special meaning.

Professor Giddings first employed this phrase in 1895, preceded by a sort of definition. He said:

I have never thought or spoken of mere physical contact hostile or friendly, as constituting association or a society. It is association if and only if accompanied by a consciousness on the part of each of the creatures implicated that the creatures with which it comes in contact are like itself. This consciousness of kind is the elementary, the generic social fact; it is sympathy, fellow feeling in the literal as distinguished from the popular sense of the word.(4*)

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1) Physics and Politics, etc. (New York, 1877), p. 21.
2) Der Rassenkampf (Innsbruck, 1883), p. 244.
4) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. V, March, 1895, p. 750. The fact that he did not here italicize the phrase "consciousness of kind," as he did most of the previous rather awkward sentence, shows that he was not at the time impressed with the great importance which he later attached to it. It was only after others, on account of its terseness and agreeable cadence, had emphasized it, that he put it forward as the basis of a system of sociology.
In his principal work, which appeared a year later, he calls this a "sociological postulate," and states it as follows:

The original and elementary subjective fact in society is the consciousness of kind. By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself.(1*)

In his *Elements of Sociology*, 1898, he endeavors to work this conception up into a system capable of being taught to classes, making much use of the term "like-mindedness." In a recent article(2*) he has condensed the principles of his system into ten propositions. In October, 1901, appeared his *Inductive Sociology*, well described by its secondary title as "A Syllabus of Methods, Analyses and Classifications, and Provisionally Formulated Laws." It scarcely goes beyond the consciousness of kind, but is characterized by extensive, I had almost mid offensive, schematization.

The importance, however, of this conception cannot be gainsaid, and even if Professor Giddings has not added anything to what has been said by others (which I am far from asserting), he has at least done good service in reviving the discussion of it, and especially of transferring the field of this discussion from morals and biology to sociology, where it properly belongs.

**Survival of the social.** - If the unconscious principle of association connected with feeling can be designated consciousness of kind, the conscious principle of association connected with reason may be called the survival of the social. The one yields individual satisfaction, the other race safety. It would probably be correct to say, so far at least as human society is concerned, that society is the result of a recognition of its advantageousness.

But the principle of advantage in biology has led to association in the animal world according to a well-understood law that natural selection unconsciously accomplishes results similar to or identical with those accomplished by reason on the human plane.

There would naturally arise at this point the old question as

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1) The Principles of Sociology, etc. (New York, 1896), p. 17.
to whether man is by nature a social being. It is a true social antinomy in the Kantian sense that both sides can be proved to the satisfaction of some, but, as in the four classical antinomies, the antithesis gains in favor in the light of scientific investigation. The affirmative or dogmatic side of the question is the one that commends itself to superficial observation as well as to the supposed honor of the race, and both these considerations win the mass. The opposite seem false because the men we know are in a sense social and, besides, it would be a humiliating admission to acknowledge that man is naturally unsocial; neither of which reasons is a legitimate argument. I will not fatigue the reader either with Aristotle's ξοον πολιτικόν, on the one hand, nor with Hobbes's bellum omnium contra omnes on the other, but coming down to more modern times, I shall give a few typical examples of the reasoning on both sides Comte, for example, speaks of the essentially spontaneous sociability of the human species, by virtue of an instinctive leaning (penchant) toward a life in common, independently of all personal calculation, and often in spite of the strongest individual interest.(1*)

Darwin devotes a section to "Man as a Social Animal," beginning with the statement that "most persons admit that man is a social being."(2*) He also says: "Judging from the analogy of the greater number of then Quadrumana, it is probable that the early ape-like progenitors of man were likewise social." And he wisely adds: "but this is not of much importance for us." We may, therefore, dismiss the thesis of this antinomy as established, if stated in this form; Man is a social being. But this does not preclude our inquiring whether man always was a social being, and, if not, how he became so. It also leaves open the definition of the term "social " thus used. We saw that the consciousness of kind led to a form of sociability, but here it is limited to the "kind." Toward any other "kind " this attraction becomes repulsion and love becomes hate. It is known that very slight race differences are sufficient to make all this

1) Philosophie positive, Vol. IV, p. 386.
difference in the sentiment, and even sections of the name race, gens, or clan that split off from the parent stock may become objects of mutant detestation and permanent hostility. Consciousness of kind, therefore, can only unite very small groups, such as hordes or clans. For that wider sociability that belongs to developed races some other principle is required. The subject will be touched upon under another head. We will restrict it here to the simple question as to the advantageousness of association.

In the first place, Aristotle himself did not maintain that man was naturally social, and attributed his sociality largely to language. (1*) But that is little to our purpose. Herbert Spencer, speaking of the laws of multiplication and the antagonism between what he calls individuation and genesis, says: "It forced men into the social state; made social organization inevitable; and has developed the social sentiments." (2*) He also speaks of man as "forced, by increase of numbers, to live more and more in presence of his fellows," (3*) and further says:

As fast as the social state establishes itself, the preservation of the society becomes a means of preserving its units. Living together arose because, on the average, it proved more advantageous to each than living apart; and this implies that maintenance of combination is maintenance of the conditions to more satisfactory living than the combined persons would otherwise have. Hence, social self-preservation becomes a proximate aim, taking precedence of the ultimate aim, individual self-preservation. (4*)

Finally, in one short sentence he sums up both these motives to sociability by saying: "Though mere love of companionship prompts primitive men to live in groups, yet the chief prompter is experience of the advantages to be derived from co-operation." (5*)

Bagehot gives expression to the same truth, all the more instructive because of the different point of view, when he says:

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What makes one tribe - one incipient tribe, one bit of a tribe - to differ from another is their relative faculty of coherence. The slightest symptom of legal development, the least indication of military bond, is then enough to turn the scale. The compact tribes win, and the compact tribes are the tamest. Civilization begins, because the beginning of civilization is a military advantage.\(^{(1^*)}\)

Galton says:

We may reckon upon the advent of a time when civilization, which is now sparse and feeble and far more superficial than it is vanned to be, shall overspread the globe. Ultimately it is sure to do so, because civilization is the necessary fruit of high intelligence when found in a social animal, and there is no plainer lesson to be read off the face of Nature than that the result of the operation of her laws is to evoke intelligence in connection with sociability. Intelligence is as much an advantage to an animal as physical strength or any other natural gift, and therefore, out of two varieties of any race of animal who are equally endowed in other respects, the most intelligent variety is sure to prevail in the battle of life. Similarly, among intelligent animals, the most social race is sure to prevail, other qualities being equal.\(^{(2^*)}\)

Darwin gave numerous illustrations of this in many of his works, and did also M. Edmond Perrier in his book entitled *Le rôle de l'association dans le règne animal et ches les peuplades primitives*. M. Espinas has done the same, and he remarks on the general subject:

There is no need of invoking here the seeking of an advantage for the group, as we have just seen that in the greater number sympathetic instincts are acquired in view of an ulterior utility, of a specific progress, and that social animals have no suspicion of the part that nature is playing for the good of the race in a more or less remote future.\(^{(3^*)}\)

The principle of the survival of the social, whether in animals or men, was clearly seen by Darwin, who says that "with those animals which were benefited by living in close association, the individuals which took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers; while those, that cared least for their comrades and lived solitary would perish in greater numbers."\(^{(4^*)}\)

Many will recall the brilliant series of articles on "Mutual Aid among Animals, Savages, etc.," by Prince

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1) *Physics and Politics*, p. 52.
Krapotkin, published some years ago in the Nineteenth Century, (Vols. XXVIII, XXIX, 1890, 1891), in which he brings out this principle more forcibly perhaps than has been done by any other writer. He concludes; that "under any circumstances sociability is the greatest advantage in the struggle for life. .... The fitted are thus the most sociable animals, and sociability appears as the chief factor in evolution" (Vol. XXVIII, p. 711). Of course, as Spencer has pointed out, this is not true of all animals and not generally true of predatory animals, though even here, as in the case of wolves, the advantages of co-operation lead them to live more or less in packs.

With regard to man, Topinard says that "his reason causes him constantly to vacillate between two tendencies: the one of associating with his fellows for the advantage which he expects to derive therefrom, and the other of entirely dispensing with them, of eliminating their competition."(1*) And Professor Loria remarks:

Now, whoever applies to sociology the results of biologic and anthropologic science, as reorganized by Darwin, must necessarily consider the social aggregate as an eminently utilitarian institution, intended to secure the welfare and defense of the individual against untoward influences from without. Hence, of two species, one of which is socially organized and the other not, the former has a much greater chance of winning in the struggle for existence; hence, also, in the course of time only the socially organized species survive, while the others, by a fatal law, perish; in this way social organization becomes the universal law of beings.(2*)

On the question of the advantageousness of association there is practical unanimity, and therefore we need not go farther with it. But it does not seem to be perceived that it is the result, like all other steps in development, of a struggle, of opposition coming from the inner nature of man. The biologists see this in animals, and Topinard, in the passage above quoted, predicates it also of the human species, but those, like Comte and Schaeflle.(3*) who insist that man is by nature a social being, forget

or do not perceive that this struggle and final development imply a primarily anti-social nature, and that it is only advantage that secures the triumph of association, either through the survival of the fittest and elimination of the unsocial, or else by a greater or less degree of direct national perception of this advantage and the growing power of interest to overcome innate aversion.

In view of all this it is interesting to note that Immanuel Kant, the "Alleszermalmer," in that important little book(1*) which it is so difficult now to consult, although it has been translated into both English and French, clearly saw this primordial dualism, which he calls the antagonism of the capacities for social organization. He says:

By antagonism of this kind I mean the unsocial sociality of man; that is, a tendency to enter the social state combined with a perpetual resistance to that tendency which is continually threatening to dissolve it Man has gregarious inclinations, feeling himself in the social state more than man by means of the development thus given to his natural tendencies. But he has also strong anti-gregarious inclinations prompting him to insulate himself, which arise out of the unsocial desire (existing concurrently with his social propensities) to force all things into compliance with his own humor; a propensity to which he naturally anticipates resistance from his consciousness of a similar spirit of resistance to others existing in himself. Now this resistance it is which awakens all the powers of man, drives him to master his propensity to indolence, and in the shape of ambition - love of honor - or avarice impels him to procure distinction for himself amongst his fellows. In this way arise the first steps from the savage state to the state of culture, which consists peculiarly in the social worth of man: talents of every kind are now unfolded, taste formed, and by gradual increase of light a preparation is made for such a mode of thinking as is capable of converting the rude natural tendency to moral distinctions into determinate practical principles, and finally of exalting a social concert that had been pathologically extorted from the mere necessities of situation into a moral union founded on the reasonable choice. But for these anti-social propensities, so unamiable in themselves, which gave birth to that resistance which every man meets with in his own self-interested pretensions, an Arcadian life would arise of perfect harmony and mutual love such as must suffocate and stifle all talents in their very germs.(2*)

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1) *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, 1784.
This remarkable passage does credit even to the brain of a Kant. It shows an insight into the nature of man which is almost prophetic and which has not usually been displayed either by the old philosophers or by the modern psychologists. It is an entirely different conception from that of Hobbes and much nearer to the truth. Only a few late writers have partially perceived it. M. Fouillée, for example, remarks:

The social state is the end toward which the world seems to be naturally tending, without this end being imposed from without. .... The world might be defined as an organism which tends to become conscious and voluntary, a republic which tends to realize itself through its own idea. .... Sociology can furnish, as we see, a particular representation of the universe, a universal type of the world conceived as a society in process of formation, failing here and succeeding elsewhere, aspiring to change mechanical force more and more into justice, and the struggle for existence into fraternity. If such was the case, the essential and indwelling power of all beings, always ready to act the moment circumstances give it access to the light of consciousness, might be expressed by the one word "sociability". (1*)

And Professor Ludwig Stein says:

Man is not, he is becoming, sociable. Sociability is not his fundamental nature, his inseparable characteristic, like, for example, his character of two-handedness, but a product of psychic development. (2*)

Upon the whole, then, we may conclude that, while the most enlightened peoples have nearly reached a stage at which it may be truly said that "man, like a cipher, is of no value when standing alone," still the belief, from the observation of such a state, in the innate sociability of man is like all the other erroneous beliefs resulting from the examination of the most highly developed products only. Such thinking costs no effort, but is only worth its cost. It is a sort of ignava ratio, and, as Dr. Ross remarks, (3*) "everything that is being done to bring to light the process of socialization and control contradicts the easy-going theory that actual society is a spontaneous product due to the social instincts of men."

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2) Deutsche Rundschau, XXV. Jahrg., Heft 4, January, 1899, p. 29.
It may be admitted that the line between instinctive and rational association is difficult to draw, and that it is not always the same as that between other animals and man, but for practical purposes it is sufficient to draw it here, and, with these qualifications, to say that sociology proper deals with national association or human society.

[To be continued.]

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IX. SOCIOLOGY AS THE DIVISION OF LABOR.

The excellent work of Professor Émile Durkheim, of the University of Bordeaux, on the division of social labor(1*) obviates the necessity of entering into a detailed consideration of this subject. He has treated it from the historical, the economic, and the sociological points of view, and has not neglected the important biological aspect of the physiological division of labor. He admits that the ancients entertained the conception and cites a line from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, but he does not point out how near Plato came in his *Laws* to formulating the whole principle.(2*) He credits the modern doctrine to Adam Smith without qualification, and does not show how much of it he borrowed from Ferguson.(3*) He also properly credits Comte with being the first to show that the law has a much broader significance than the economists supposed. It is, in fact, essentially a sociological law. But M. Durkheim has expanded it until at his hands it becomes virtually coextensive with sociology itself. The economists have sufficiently lauded the subject, so that both Comte(4*) and Mill(5*) have admitted that its importance has been sometimes overestimated. Certain extremes to which it is often carried, and evils which it thereby causes to social welfare, have been sufficiently emphasized, and M. Durkheim has not overlooked this aspect of the subject.

2) Ἐκ δὴ τοῦτων πλεονεκτείναι γίνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾴδιον, ὅταν εἰς εὐ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καίρῃ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. - Plato's *Republic*, 370, C.
As illustrating M. Durkheim's large claims for the division of labor, we may note his remark on p. 375 that "in determining the principal cause of the progress of the division of labor we have determined at the same time the essential factor in what we call civilization." I long ago defined material civilization as "the utilization of the materials and forces of nature." I always recognized, however, the immaterial or spiritual element in civilization as distinct from this, but not independent of it, and indeed as realizable only in a very slight degree without it. The spiritual life of man may be regarded as a function of his physical life, and only capable of a high development when the latter has reached a certain stage at which the higher psychic attributes are liberated and allowed to act. The division of labor, therefore, as a factor in civilization must depend upon the degree to which it contributes to the utilization by man of the materials and forces of nature. For my own part I look upon invention and labor as the chief factors, and the division of labor an simply the natural and necessary method spontaneously adopted for economizing the results of invention and labor. This does not, however, detract from its importance, and if anyone is capable of imagining a series of inventions looking to the production of material goods such as has taken place, and the amount of labor necessary, with the aid of those inventions, to produce the goods, all going on throughout human history without any division or specialization of that labor, such a one is in position on apotheosize the division of labor. It is, however, rather to be regarded as a part of the invention, viz., the devising of a method of economical labor. And if it is no more than nature has always done in the physiological division of labor, this is only one more of the innumerable instances of the identity in the mode of operation of instinct and reason in accomplishing the same economical result. Indeed, it might be shown that the chasm between physiological and social division of labor is not an wide as it seems, and that, on the one hand, the higher animals seem to exercise a modicum of reason, while, on the other, the lowest human races have been guided to the little that they have applied the principle by something closely approaching an instinct.
And still all this does not derogate from the value of the social division of labor. Looked at as such, and not merely as an economic device for the more rapid production of wealth, it means nothing less in its fullest application than that each member of society is in reality always working far every other member, while, on the other hand, every other member is always working for him. This is the sociological statement of the law, which is the prime factor at least in the production of social solidarity. Its economic aspects have been sufficiently dwelt upon.

X. SOCIOLOGY AS IMITATION.

It would scarcely be supposed a priori that imitation could be worked up into a system of sociology, yet M. Gabriel Tarde has accomplished this feat. In his fine series of books, The Laws of Imitation (1890), Social Logic (1895), and Universal Opposition (1897), not to speak of several others making collateral applications of his principles or summarizing them, he has made imitation the cornerstone of a philosophical edifice that is remarkable in many aspects. As a system of sociology it is too well known to need exposition. The idea of imitation as a social factor is, of course, not new. Schopenhauer declared that history made a false claim in pretending to be always telling different things,

when it, from beginning to end, is only constantly repeating the same thing under other names and another garb. The true philosophy of history consists, then, in the view that in all these endless changes and their confusion we have continually before us only the same unchangeable essence which is the same today as yesterday and always. It should thus recognize the identity in all the events of ancient as well as of modern times, of the East as well as of the West, and, in spite of all the differences in the special circumstances, in the costumes and the modes, it should perceive everywhere the same humanity.(1*)

Leibnitz characterized human progress as a psittacism.(2*) Comte on several occasions indulged in profound remarks bearing on the general subject. Speaking of the laws of mechanics as typical of the order of nature, he says:

Positivism represents each one of them as the necessary germ of a greater law which belongs to all the phenomena of activity, although at first it may seem to be limited to those of motion. Thus Kepler's law becomes a particular case of the law of persistence which reigns everywhere and whence are derived, for example, habit in living beings and the conservative instinct in society. In the same way Galileo's law is connected with the general law which always reconciles the action of the parts with the existence of the whole, and from which there results in sociology the fundamental harmony between order and progress.\(^1\)

In his chapter on the "Positive Theory of Human Language" he does ample justice to imitate expression (expression minique) as the initial step, and traces it up through imagination, art, music, poetry, and prose.\(^2\) Miss Sarah E. Simons has recently called attention\(^3\) to the fact that both Bagehot and Sir Henry Maine anticipated Tarde in many of his leading ideas. N. K. Michailovsky in a work first published in Russian\(^4\) in 1882, entitled *The Heroes and the Crowd*, goes over much of the ground of Trade's works, and anticipates a large amount of what has been said by Le Bon and others relative or the collective mind. But this is, to all who do not read Russian, a sealed book as yet.

It is not, then, the idea of imitation as an important social factor newly launched by M. Tarde upon the world that justifies its treatment here; it is only because he has so expanded - I had almost said, exaggerated - the conception as to make it embrace a complete system of sociology that it merits such treatment. When he says that "society is imitation, and imitation is a species of somnambulism;"\(^5\) that "the result of imitations is the only thing that interests history, and is its true definition;"\(^6\) that "the supreme law of imitation seems to be its tendency toward an indefinite progression;"\(^7\) that "science consists in considering any reality under these three aspects: repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations,"\(^8\) he has opened a field so large that it

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\(^3\) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for May, 1901, Vol. VI, pp. 818, 819.
\(^5\) *Lois de l'imitation*, 2e édition, p. 95.
\(^8\) *Lois sociales*, p. 10.
is entitled to be called a system of philosophy. The latitude he gives to the terms "imitation," "repetition," "opposition," and "invention" makes it in fact a cosmic philosophy. Still, his point of view is always sociological or psychological, and, as in the case of Bagehot, we are surprised to see how many cosmic laws can be seized, as it were, by their tops, and clearly formulated in terms that are intelligible to them chiefly familiar with the sciences lower in the natural scale. This is what M. Tarde has done. His terminology is strictly sociological and psychological, and therefore his philosophy seems to be wholly new. It is not until the homologues of his leading terms are found in the other sciences that it is seen that the laws and principles are all thoroughly well known, but rarely had anyone perceived that these physical, chemical, and biological laws hold true of mind and society. M. Tarde has not wholly neglected to point out these homologies, but he has never brought them all together in one place or attempted to arrange them systematically. He occasionally throws them in incidentally in a manner to convey to the reader the impression that he first arrived at his principles as exemplified in the most complex phenomena, and that their application in the less complex fields occurred to him in the progress of his thinking and writing, and were noted as they were perceived and used as illustrations. It is in his little work on the Social Laws, published in 1898, an English translation of which has appeared in America,(1*) that the principal correlations of the kind here considered have been made. It is here that he says:

After these lengthy preliminaries, the time has come when it would be in place to set forth the general laws governing imitative repetition, which are to sociology what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics.(2*)

In a footnote on p. 28 of the Laws of Imitation, 1895, he mentions the resemblance of imitation to heredity, and on p. 159 of the same work we find rather vague allusions to physical correlations; but his statement in his Logique sociale (p. 123), that

imitation corresponds exactly with memory, and is, in fact, social memory, shows that he had then (1895) scarcely gone below the psychologic plane, and even here had imperfectly seized the relation, since the psychologic homologue of imitation is rather what Professor James so happily terms "the stream of thought,"(1*) which takes the place in modern psychology of the old, obsolete notion of "states of consciousness." In a review of the *Social Laws*,(2*) in which Tarde's whole system was more or less fully considered from the present point of view, I pointed out what I regard as the homologues of his leading terms in physics and biology. They only need be stated here. Thus, the cosmic homologue of imitation (which involves repetition) is causation, while its biologic homologue is heredity; the cosmic or physical homologue of opposition is collision, and its biologic homologue is the environment; the cosmic homologue of invention is evolution, of which variation, the biologic homologue, is only a special case. The product of the co-operation of heredity with the environment is variation, and the product of the co-operation of causation and collision is evolution. In the same sense the product of the co-operation of imitation and opposition is invention. Adaptation merely expresses the direction that evolution, variation, and invention shall take, and the limits of their possible action. It is the same in all departments of nature, and is the synthesis of all the forces involved. They are all, working together, essentially constructive.

**XI. SOCIOLOGY AS UNCONSCIOUS SOCIAL CONSTRAINT.**

Quite a school of sociologists has recently arisen which holds, under varying forms and with a varying terminology, that the principal social fact is an unconscious coercion of the members of society to do, or refrain from doing, certain things. This coercion is never physical, but always moral, i. e., psychic. It is mainly negative, forbidding action, but is also often positive, requiring action. Its earliest and best-known form is that which is called by Spencer "ceremonial government," a clear

definition of which is given in the first paragraph of his *Ceremonial Institutions*, a work which contains so many illustrations of the principle as applied to uncivilized races that no time need be spent in discussing this aspect of it.

That something similar to ceremonial government exists among civilized peoples has also been more or less clearly perceived, but rarely has this relation been pointed out. As in the case of superstitions among moderns who look upon the scarcely worse superstitions of both ancient and savage peoples as something gross and absurd, so the ceremonial government that exists in the most enlightened communities is not recognized as such, and is morally accepted simply as a matter of course. But keen analyzers of human nature perceive that all men at all times are hedged about by a social code which, though unwritten, is as binding as the most rigid statute laws.

Carpenter says:

While the early Habits are thus in a great degree determined for each individual by the family influences under which he is brought up, he soon comes under those social influences which in a great degree shape the future course of his Mental life, constituting that aggregate which was designated by the Greeks as the Νόμος. This term (sometimes translated "custom" and sometimes "law") may be considered as expressing the custom which has the force of law, and which is often far less easily changed than any written law; becoming so completely ingrained in the Constitution of a People or Class, as to constitute a "second nature," which only a long course of the "discipline of circumstances" can alter.(1*)

If the action lies clearly within the sphere of duty, it is characterized as "moral" and actions of this class are well understood to be subject to the moral law. But perhaps a majority of the actions that are performed from this sort of impersonal compulsion are morally indifferent, and for these there is no name. Mr. Spencer says:

A further component of the ethical consciousness, and often the largest component, is the represented opinion of other individuals, who also, in one sense, constitute an authority and exercise a coercion. This, either as actually implied in other's behavior, or as imagined if they are not present, commonly serves more than anything else to restrain or impel. How large a component this is, we see in a child who blushes when wrongly suspected.

of a transgression, as much as when rightly suspected; and probably most have had proof that, when guiltless, the feeling produced by the conceived reprobation of others is scarcely distinguishable from the feeling which would be produced by such reprobation if guilty. That an imagined public opinion is the chief element of consciousness in cases where the acts ascribed or committed are intrinsically wrong, is shown when this imagined or expressed opinion refers to acts which are not intrinsically wrong. The emotion of shame ordinarily accompanying some gross breach of social convention which is morally indifferent, or even morally praiseworthy (say wheeling home the barrow of a costermonger who has lamed himself), may be quite as strong as the emotion of shame which follows the proved utterance of an unwarranted libel - an act intrinsically wrong.(1*)

Professor James quotes Darwin's fine analysis of this subject from the physiological point of view, to which he appends the following footnote:

"The certainty that we are well dressed," a charming woman has said, "gives us a peace of heart compared to which that yielded by the consolations of religion is as nothing."(2*)

Thoreau somewhere speaks of the sense of shame he experienced in coming in from a ramble with dust on his shoes and clothes, and meeting his well-dressed townsmen, who were mentally incapable of appreciating his love of nature. I am myself very sensitive to the violation of proprieties, and often, contrary to all my reasoning about it, on coming in by daylight from a botanical excursion, carrying the insignia of my Fach, and looking rude and uncouth as the effects of a long jaunt in the woods, I have suffered excruciating agony over the fear, and sometimes the fact, of meeting someone who knew me and could but wonder at my plight. This irrational slavery to social propriety is no doubt a serious obstacle to the study and enjoyment of nature, and naturalists and artists adopt all sorts of devices to overcome it. Only by making an outing fashionable, or by accomplishing it in a fashionable way, can the evil be avoided; hence regular outing habits and neatly made apparatus for work. Sketching is perfectly en règle, and my botanical portfolio was a godsend, because with it I was supposed to be sketching. Skilled labor, too, is respectable, and when

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geologizing around cities my geological hammer is my passport, because I am always repairing telegraph wires - an illusion that I am careful not to dispel.

But the principle is still broader than the illustrations thus far given would imply. M. Durkheim has identified it with social constraint, and defines the principal social fact as "any mode of action capable of exercising an external constraint upon an individual; or which is general throughout a given society having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations;"(1*) and he further says that "a social fact is recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals."(2*)

M. Fouillée uses the expression "collective determinism "(3*) for practically the same principle, which would be excellent but for a certain ambiguity in the word "determinism," and its much more frequent use as the other of free will.

The expression "social imperative" seems to have been first used by Professor Ludwig Stein, of the University of Bern.(4*) It is among the happiest contributions to sociological terminology. It is naturally affiliated upon Kant's categorical imperative, which covers all cases of ethical or moral action, and it may be extended to take in all the fields of unconscious or impersonal constraint not coming under the categorical imperative. It is, therefore, rather in be regretted that Professor Stein should divide it up and enumerate other alleged imperatives, such as religious, political, juridical, artistic, scientific, etc.(5*) These are

4) As this expression was being freely used in America without indication of source, I wrote to Professor Stein early in 1899 to ask him when he had first used it. In his reply, dated April 18, 1899, he says: "I have been using the expression 'social imperative' (socialer Befehl) in my lectures for the past ten years, but only published it in my Archiv für Philosophie in 1896." In the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for September, 1896, Vol. II, p. 257, Dr. Ross uses this expression. In conversation with him he was unable to give the source, and said it must have then been "in the air."
5) Revue internationale de sociologie, Vère année, janvier 1897, pp. 62, 63.
all social imperatives, if they are imperatives at all in this sense, i.e., unconscious and impersonal influences determining conduct. In his large work(1*) Professor Stein has formulated the social imperative, partially paraphrasing the language of Kant's celebrated rule of conduct, as follows:

So act as, in each of thy actions, to strengthen not only thine own life, but at the same time that of thy fellow-man, but especially to insure and to elevate that of future generations.

The conception which we are considering also includes all that Dr. Russ has denominated "social control,"(2*) as well as the co-ordinate phenomena which he calls "social influence," the two together constituting "social ascendency."(3*) Although he says that social control is "purposive and at its inception conscious," still in reading his book we see that he is dealing as much with unconscious and impersonal forces as do ceremonial government and social imperatives. Dr. Ross has written a book that is at once brilliant and profound. It fairly sparkles with happy phrases, quaint words, and pat illustrations, and deals with a recondite subject in a scholarly and masterly way. His style as well as his theme recalls Tarde's works, but he never causes the reader to lose the main thread in a maze of illustrations and digressions. He has laid all history, science, and philosophy under tribute, and writes with all the ease and grace of a Macaulay. This work, which consists of a series of papers previously published in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, now brought together, revised, and expanded, is probably the most important contribution thus far made to the genesis and essential nature of social order. When he says, "the truth just coming into focus, that all groups and organs constantly exercise manifold cohesive pressures and attractions upon their units, is a discovery of the first order, and cannot fail to influence the future of social science,"(4*) he sounds a clear note, and one

1) Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie (Stuttgart, 1897), p. 705.
4) This JOURNAL, Vol. III, p. 822.
that is in perfect harmony with the sociological thought of today. It is a paradox that the things that are most familiar are the least perceived, and these silent powers that make for social order, like the air we breathe, because they press equally in all directions, are not felt. It requires a Priestley to discover them in the sociological laboratory. Further researches in this fruitful direction will doubtless carry the principle back toward the biological plane and show that a large part of social control is or once was a true social selection, and that much of the spirit of submission to social imperatives has become constitutional through a long process of elimination of the unfit, i.e., the unsocial. It is beginning to be seen that the moral code, conformity to which has always seemed to depend upon the free will of the agent, is really, when broadly interpreted, self-enforcing, and now we are brought to realize that the conventional code also is self-enforcing, and that social as well as moral action is determined.

**XII. SOCIOLOGY AS THE STRUGGLE OF RACES.**

I will terminate this enumeration of the principal systems of sociology with a brief reference to the doctrine of the struggle of races. I do not put this last because I regard it of less importance than the others, nor is the brevity of the treatment due to any disposition to disparage the doctrine. On the contrary, so far as the claim is concerned to the merit of really constituting sociology, I regard this principle, when seen in its full extent, with all its collateral implications, as coming much nearer to the establishment of this claim than any single one of those that have been considered. This is the ground of my apparent neglect of it here. It forms so large a part of my own conception of sociology that it will be necessary to deal with it extensively elsewhere. It opens up in the only satisfactory way the whole question of the origin and, through this, of the true nature of society itself.

To Professor Ludwig Gumplowicz is due the merit of having brought this subject fully and squarely before the world. Of course, as in all such movements of human thought, earlier writers had given out more or less distinct adumbrations of the
idea. Hobbes's notion of a universal struggle scarcely ranks as such an adumbration. Heraclitus came much nearer to it when he said that war was the mother of all things. The struggle for existence in the animal world, which results in evolution, is the biological starting-point for the discussion of all such questions, but natural selection, the principle underlying that movement, is not the sociological principle here involved. Mr. Spencer has often worked dangerously close to this conception, but he can scarcely be said to have formulated it. Bagehot, who scented so many later accepted truths, saw some of the latest consequences of the race struggle when he said:

The beginning of civilization is marked by an intense legality; that legality is the very condition of its existence, the bond which ties it together; but that legality - that tendency to impose a settled customary yoke upon all men and all actions - if it goes on, kills out the variability implanted by nature, and makes different men and different ages facsimiles of other men and other ages, as we see them so often. Progress is only possible in those happy cases where the force of legality has gone far enough to bind the nation together, but not far enough to kill out all varieties and destroy nature's perpetual tendency to change.(1*)

Primarily in his *Rassenkampf* (1883),(2*) but also in other, chiefly later works (*Grundriss der Sociologie*, 1885; *Sociologie und Politik*, 1892; *Sociologische Staatsidee*, 1892; second edition, 1902; *Allgemeines Staatsrecht*, 1897, which he calls a revised edition with changed title of his early *Philosophisches Staatsrecht*, 1877), Gumplovicz has been ringing the changes on this, his favorite idea, until it seems to have almost become with him an *idée fixe*. But a great idea is worth repeating any number of times, provided the iteration does not ultimately dull, instead of sharpening, the reader's wits. In this case the slow progress of the idea, due in part to that unfortunate misomimethism of the world's élite, partly to the absorption of every sociological thinker in his own pet idea, and partly, in this case, it is to be feared, to a certain pungency, satire, and impatience with the ideas of others, that characterize the author's style, seemed to

1) *Physics and Politics*, p. 64.
2) The theory was clearly formulated by him eight years earlier in a pamphlet entitled: *Race und Staat. Eine Untersuchung über das Gesetz der Staatenbildung* (Wien, 1875), 56 pp., 8vo.
further justify persistent exposition. The attention, however, of a few sociologists has been arrested by this array of books, and Roncali, Vanni, and Vaccaro, in Italy, and Ratzenhofer in Austria, have made it the subject of more or less serious consideration. Novicow, of Odessa, has written a book on the struggles among societies,(1*) but he does not treat the subject from the same point of view, and indeed cannot be said to be dealing with the same subject at all. Gumplowicz is not mentioned. Vaccaro(2*) does, indeed, treat the subject, somewhat as a critic, pointing out certain limitations to the doctrine, and suggesting some wholesome modifications of Gumplowicz's more extreme positions, but scarcely advancing the general stock of truth with regard to it. Ratzenhofer, however, to some extent in his large work,(3*) but especially in his later and more philosophical work,(4*) has worked up fairly abreast of the subject and has greatly illumined all the more obscure parts of it. This work is profoundly philosophical as well as scientific and classical, and constitutes one of the most important contributions that have been made to sociology during the past decade. Ratzenhofer shows the precise *modus operandi* of the whole process of social assimilation through successive subjugations, and works out every step in the long train of consequences, bringing about, one after another, in a uniform (unilateral) order the several social conditions; conquest, caste, inequality, law, the state, the people, and the nation. Although this is not all of social assimilation,(5*) it covers so large a part of it, explaining all the older civilizations and holding true for all the present leading

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5) I take pleasure in calling attention to the able papers of Miss Sarah E. Simons on this subject that recently appeared in the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY* for May, July, September and November, 1901, and January, 1902. These papers are written in an enlightened spirit and suggest a line of sociological study of the greatest promise.
nations of Europe, that it furnishes the key to the great bulk of all the phenomena of human history, and constitutes the most comprehensive principle at work in social evolution. It furnishes the first scientific, or in the least satisfactory, theory that has been advanced as to the origin and true constitution of the state, so that, after grasping this principle in its entirety, all the old notions about the state become rubbish, and any work on the nature of the state that does not recognize and start from this standpoint - and such are still constantly appearing - is superficial and practically worthless. But the temptation to go farther into the interior of this fertile field must be resisted.

I have now enumerated and briefly discussed twelve of the leading sociological conceptions or unitary principles that have been put forward with large claims in the case of each to being in and of itself the science of sociology. There are others, but these papers have assumed undue length, and it becomes necessary, to bring them to a close. Any one of these views might be, and most of them have been, set forth in some way that, considered alone, it would seem to justify this claim. It is broad that the imperfect treatment that I have been able to give to them all may place the reader in a position to judge for himself as to the matter, and if not to weigh each one and assign it its true rank and value, at least to perceive that in the nature of things no single one of them can constitute a science. It is also hoped that enlightened minds may rise to something like a realizing sense of the vast import of sociology, for no single one of these conceptions is to be rejected. All are legitimate parts of the science, and there are many more equally weighty that remain as yet more or less unperceived.

All these various lines of investigation, together with all others that have been or shall be followed out, may be compared to so many minor streams, all flowing in a given direction and converging so as ultimately to unite in one great river that will represent the whole science of sociology, such as it is destined to become when the present period of social myopia shall have passed away.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

LESTER, F. WARD.

[--- The End ---]